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Martin and Hayes: Court-Martial Sentences: Time for More Transparency

COURT-MARTIAL SENTENCES: TIME FOR MORE
TRANSPARENCY
ChristopherE. Martin*
Timothy P. Hayes, Jr.**
"In this whole area of sentences and sentencing, we have for too long
had little serious questioning, fewer answers, and even less action.
What we need more than anything else right now is thought and
discussion, with a view toward change."I

I.

INTRODUCTION

Federal law requires district court judges to state in open court the
reasons for a sentence imposed,2 a requirement the Supreme Court called
"sound judicial practice" in a key decision on the issue.3 Courts-martial,

* Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army; Circuit Judge, Fourth Judicial Circuit, United
States Army. The views reflected herein are personal to the authors and do not necessarily represent
the views of the Department of Defense, the United States Army Trial Judiciary, or any other
official entity. The authors thank Judge Paul Grimm, United States District Court, District of
Maryland, and Chief Judge Frank D. Whitney, United States District Court, Western District of
North Carolina, for their input on federal sentencing practices.
* * Colonel, Chief Trial Judge, United States Army.
1.

Denise K. Vowell, To Determine an Appropriate Sentence: Sentencing in the Military

Justice System, 114 MIL. L. REv. 87, 87 (1986) (quoting George S. Prugh, Evolving Military Law:
Sentences and Sentencing, ARMY LAW., Dec. 1974, at 1, 6). As Judge Vowell noted, General Prugh

distinguished between the "sentence," or imposed penalty by judicial decree, and "sentencing,"
which is the process of formulating the appropriate sentence. Id. at 87 n.2. This Article focuses on
the need to connect the two. Major General Prugh served as the twenty-eighth Judge Advocate
General of the Army. George R. Smawley, The Past as Prologue: Major General George S. Prugh,
Jr. (Ret.) (1942-1975)-Witness to Insurgent War, the Law of War, and the Expanded Role of Judge

Advocates in Military Operations, 187 MIL. L. REV. 96, 151 (2006). Colonel Denise Vowell later
served for five years as the Army's 18th Chief Trial Judge. George R. Smawley, A Majority of One:
A Summary and Analysis of an Oral History of Colonel Denise K. Vowell (Retired), United States
Army, 1973-2006, ARMY LAW., Jan. 2015, at 26, 47.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c).
3. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). Eight out of the nine justices joined
Section III of the opinion, discussing the importance and implementation of reasoned sentencing
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as Article I federal courts,4 have no such requirement for transparent
sentences 5 and perpetuate a culture that discourages judges from
explaining their sentences. Yet with Congressional reforms aligning
6
courts-martial sentencing more and more with federal practice, the time
is ripe to reexamine military judges' reticence to explain their sentences.
In this era of significant military justice reform, enhanced victims'
rights, and continued scrutiny of the military justice process,7 military
judges' hesitation to explain their sentences is a lost opportunity to boost
trust and acceptance of the court-martial process by the public and
participants' and to maximize the effectiveness of sentences for both
defendants and victims. Already required in federal district courts,
explaining the reasons for court-martial sentences would advance the
same goals in the military system to ensure a consistent and transparent
process and enhance confidence in the outcome.'
Part I of this Article examines the evolution of federal sentence
transparency as a baseline for comparison, including the sound policy
behind explaining a sentence. 10 Part II then details the statutory,
regulatory, case law, and ethical background for sentence transparency,
or the lack thereof, in courts-martial." Next, this Article analyzes
empirical data, including the prevailing conservative culture in the
military judiciary and a recent survey of military judges, to juxtapose the
ongoing hesitation by military judges to explain their sentences with an

decisions. See id. at 340.
4. Courts-martial derive from Congress' authority in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution
"[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
5. Congress' statutory sentencing guidelines specifically exclude offenses under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ"). See 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a).
6. See infra discussion in Section III.B; see, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 537, 133 Stat. 1363 (2019) (requiring for the first time, the
Secretary of Defense is to develop non-binding guidelines for sentences in courts-martial).
7. See, e.g., MILITARY JUSTICE REVIEW GROUP, REPORT OF THE MILITARY JUSTICE REVIEW
GROUP, PART I: UCMJ RECOMMENDATIONS 20-23 (2015) [hereinafter MJRG REPORT] (describing

recent legislative changes, particularly as to treatment of sexual assault allegations, as designed to
maintain public confidence in the military justice process).
8. As the Supreme Court explained in Rita, a judge's use of reasoned decisions "underlies
the public's trust in the judicial institution." Rita, 551 U.S. at 356.
9. For example, court-martial sessions are not only individualized but also highly scripted to
ensure that a court-martial at Fort Benning, Georgia, proceeds much like a court-martial in
Afghanistan, or anywhere else trial is held. See U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, PAM. 27-9, MILITARY

JUDGES' BENCHBOOK ch. 1-1 (Feb. 29, 2020) [hereinafter DA PAM. 27-9]; see also Lieutenant
Colonel Andrew R. Norton, The Differences Between Military Courts-Martialand Civilian Courts,
THE NAT'L JUD. COLL. (June 10, 2019), https://www.judges.org/the-differences-between-militarycourts-martial-and-civilian-courts (comparing rights and practices in military versus civilian courts);
MJRG REPORT, supra note 7, at 20-21.
10. See infra PartI.
11. See infra PartIII.
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expressed interest in doing so, consistent with the trend toward increased
sentence transparency. 12 Putting all of this information together leads to
several takeaways that military judges can use now to improve
court-martial sentencing: (1) no statute or case law prohibits military
judges from explaining their sentences;13 (2) existing statutes, rules, and
case law provide the necessary discretion and guidance for military
judges to explain their sentences free of error;14 and (3) military judges
should explain their sentences because of the clear benefits to the
participants in the trial process, to courts conducting appellate review,
and to increasing public understanding and confidence in court-martial
results."
Part III concludes with suggested guidelines by which military
judges can legally and appropriately explain their sentences while
preserving judicial discretion and minimizing the risk of error.16
Ultimately, increased sentence transparency in courts-martial would
benefit defendants, victims, the public, and the military justice process
and would help preserve the integrity of courts-martial sentences both in
perception and in reality.
II.

FEDERAL SENTENCING TRANSPARENCY

Federal sentencing is complex, and this Article attempts to explain
only enough of it to understand how and why courts articulate their
sentences.17
A.

The Process in a Nutshell

Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act ("SRA") of 1984,18 federal
judges freely engaged in "indeterminate sentencing" 19 in criminal cases,

12. See infra Part III.J.
13. See infra Part III.B.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part III.J.
16. See infra Part Iv; infra app.
17. As the Sentencing Commission noted, as to the Guidelines alone, there have been "tens of
thousands of federal appeals involving the guidelines and nearly three dozen Supreme Court
decisions concerning the guidelines." U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE
BASICS 5 (2018) [hereinafter FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS].

18. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. II, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
19. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989). For a historical view, see Ex parte
United States, 242 U.S. 27, 38 (1916), in which Chief Justice White penned that, despite the district
court's endorsement of the defendant's good "disposition, character and habits," among other
factors for leniency, that the court exceeded its authority by imposing a suspension that had the
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bounded only by statutory limits that allowed wide discretion in the
sentences they imposed. 20 This judicial discretion, and concomitant
appellate deference, resulted in "[s]erious disparities" among sentences,
even for similarly-situated offenses or defendants 2 1 Coupled with the
equally broad executive power of parole officers, federal sentences were
anything but predictable. 22
The SRA marked a sea of change in federal sentencing practices,
with the goal of increasing predictability, transparency, and
consistency. 23 Among other features, the SRA spelled out statutory
sentencing factors,24 created and centralized the role of a presentence
report ("PSR"),25 and abolished parole.2 6 Further, the SRA created the
("Sentencing
Commission
standing United States Sentencing
Commission") to develop sentence ranges, or guidelines ("Guidelines"),
based on characteristics of the offense, surrounding circumstances, and
characteristics of the offender. 27
The first set of Guidelines came into effect on November 1, 1987,
and have been under revision ever since. 28 Originally intended to be
binding on courts in most circumstances, 29 the United States Supreme
Court, in United States v. Booker,30 later applied the Sixth Amendment

practical effect of avoiding any sentence as required by statute. Apparently persuaded, however, by
the district court's meritorious intent, the Court held that the "exceptional conditions" of the case

required the exercise of "reasonable discretion . .. to temporarily suspend the issue of the writ [of
mandamus], so as to afford ample time for executive clemency or such other action as may be
required to meet the situation." Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. at 52-53.
20. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363; see also FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS, supra note 17, at
1.
21. Mistretta,488 U.S. at 364-66.
22. Id.
23. The effects included "sharply curtailing the discretion of the sentencing judge, abolishing
parole, reducing good time credit, and authorizing appeal of sentences in specified circumstances by
the prosecution and defense." THOMAS w. HUTCHINSON ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND
PRACTICE, at v (2019).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
25.

FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS, supra note 17, at 5. The presentence report is based

on an extensive background investigation by a probation officer and includes a recommended
application of sentence guidelines. Id. at 6.
26. Id. at 2, 10.
27. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217, 98 Stat. 1987, 2017-18. The express purposes of the
Commission are to "establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice
system," and to "develop means of measuring the degree to which the sentencing, penal, and

correctional practices are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section
3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code." Id. 98 Stat. at 2018 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 991(b)(1)-(2)).
28. U.S. SENT'G GUIDELINES MANUAL § lA (U.S. SENT'G COMM'N 2018) [hereinafter
GUIDELINES MANUAL]. The Commission, with its permanent mandate to monitor federal sentencing

practices, "views the guideline-writing process as evolutionary." Id.
29. Id. § 1A2.
30. 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005).
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31
right to trial by jury to hold that the Guidelines are only advisory.
However, the advisory Guidelines "remain the 'starting point and the
initial benchmark' in the federal sentencing process." 32 The actual
Guidelines are reflected in the voluminous and oft-updated Guidelines
Manual, which contains detailed procedures for determining sentence
ranges, as well as supporting policy statements and commentary.33
Post-SRA and post-Booker, federal sentencing involves three
substantial steps: 3 4 (1) calculating the applicable sentencing range based
on statutory minimums and maximums and the accompanying "offense
level" under the Guidelines Manual; (2) considering applicable policy
statements and commentary in the Guidelines Manual as to whether a
departure from the guideline range is warranted-meaning a sentence
that deviates above or below the predetermined sentencing range for that
offense, offender, and circumstances, but still falls within the Guidelines
framework; and (3) considering all statutory sentencing factors under 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a), including but not limited to the Guidelines and
Guidelines Manual, as to whether a "variance," or a sentence completely
35
outside of the Guidelines' framework, is warranted. The "final guiding
36
principle," as stated by the SRA, is to impose a sentence "sufficient,
but not greater than necessary," to comply with the statutory purposes
set forth in the SRA.37
Federal sentencing and the sentencing hearing itself are
adversarial. 38 The PSR is prepared and provided to the parties ahead of
time for reference at the hearing. 39 A judge must give sufficient
pre-hearing notice before "departing" from the applicable Guidelines
range, but need not give advance notice in order to "vary" from the

31.

Id. at 246.

32.

FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS, supra note 17, at 6 (quoting Gall v. United States,

552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007)).
33.
34.

See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 28, § 1A2.
FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS, supra note 17, at 17. Thanks also to Judge Grimm

and Chief Judge Whitney for explaining and modeling these steps.
35. Id. at 17-18. Judicial discretion to part ways with the Guidelines when justice in a
particular case so warrants it was assured by the Supreme Court in Booker and subsequent cases.
Statutory limits, of course, always apply. See id.
36.

FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS, supra note 17, at 29.

37.

18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a).

The purposes identified by 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) include

the need for

the sentence to "reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide
just punishment for the offense" (retribution); "to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct"
(deterrence); "to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant" (incapacitation); and "to

provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most effective matter" (rehabilitation). Id.
38. FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS, supra note 17, at 10-11.

§ 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D).

39. Id. at 10.
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Guidelines, since "variance" is based on the application of all statutory
sentencing factors and not just the Guidelines. 40 At the sentencing
session, the prosecution and defense can preserve any objections to the
PSR, introduce evidence, and argue for an appropriate sentence. 4 1 The
defendant, 42 and victim in applicable cases, 43 has a right to allocution.
The judge typically announces her sentence immediately after both
sides, and the defendant and any victim (if they so choose), have been
heard.
B.

Announcing the Sentence: What Is Said (andNot Said) on the
Record

Practically speaking, since the SRA and Booker, how much a
federal judge explains on the record about the sentence imposed often
relates directly to how closely that sentence tracks the Guidelines.
Making an adequate record for the sentence imposed is important in
order to survive appellate review.'
C.

SRA Requirements to Explain the Sentence

First, the SRA requires a judge, generally, to "state in open court
the reasons" for the sentence imposed.45 Sentences that involve more
discretion require more explanation: If the sentence imposed is "of the
kind, and within the range" determined by the Sentencing Commission,
and the possible sentencing range exceeds twenty-four months, then the
court must state the "reason for imposing a sentence at a particular point
within the range."'4 6 If the sentence imposed is "not of the kind, or is
outside the range" determined by the Sentencing Commission, i.e., the
court applied variance, then the court must state "the specific reason for
40. Id. at 11, 31-32; see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (stating that when
reviewing a sentencing decision, the court will "take into account the totality of the circumstances,"
which includes the statutory factors).
41. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(l)-(3).
42. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii); see Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 303-04 (1961).
43. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(3ix4)(B); see 18 U.S.C. § 3771.
44. As the Sixth Circuit put it, "[W]e have consistently held, post-Booker, that a sentence may
be procedurally unreasonable if the district court did not consider the applicable Guidelines range or
neglected to consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and instead simply chose a
sentence that the judge deemed appropriate." United States v. Vowell, 516 F.3d 503, 510 (6th Cir.
2008).
45. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212, 98 Stat. 1987, 1990 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(c)).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1). As one circuit court explained, "The principal basis for the
requirement that a court explain its choice of a sentence within the guideline range when the range
exceeds twenty-four months is to facilitate a court's ability to treat like cases alike." United States v.
Parrado, 911 F.2d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1990).
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imposition of a sentence different from that described, which reasons
must also be stated with specificity in a statement of reasons form." 47 In
addition to what is said in open court, the sentencing judge must also
complete a "written statement of reasons for the sentence imposed,"
including a reason for any departure from the Guidelines. 48 This
Statement of Reasons ("SOR") records, largely in checklist format,
whether the court adopted the PSR with or without change; any
mandatory minimum sentence; the determination as to the Guidelines
range; whether there were any departures or variance; and, if applicable,
the reasons for the departure or variance. 4 9
To summarize the SRA approach, how much and exactly what a
federal judge explains on the record as to the sentence imposed depends
on the application of the statutory sentencing factors (the first of which
incorporates the findings of the PSR, and the fourth of which accounts
for the predetermined Guidelines sentencing range); 50 any aggravating or
mitigating circumstances not otherwise accounted for by the
Guidelines;' and any pinpoint application or departure from the
sentencing range prescribed by the Guidelines for that offense."
D. Sentencing Commission Guidelines on Explaining Sentences
As expected, the Guidelines themselves elaborate on and
implement the requirements of the SRA and other federal law. First, the
Guidelines, consistent with federal law, dictate that race, sex, national
origin, creed, religion, and socioeconomic status are "not relevant" to

47. § 3553(c)(2). Any in camera statements that were relied on must also be incorporated by
reference. Id. In comparing the difference in language between § 3553(c)(1) and § 3553(c)(2), one
court resolved the requirement to state "the reason" in

§ 3553(c)(1)

and the requirement to state "the

specific reason" in § 3553(c)(2) by explaining that "consistent with the congressional goal of
'avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities,' ... Congress intended that the most detailed
explanation be set forth for a sentence beyond the boundary of the Guideline range." United States

v. Cervantes, 878 F.2d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1989). Another circuit court explained, "Like a verbal
statement, a written statement is also mandatory under § 3553(c)(2), and this requirement admits of
no ambiguity even without interpreting case law on point." United States v. Mendoza, 543 F.3d

1186, 1196 (10th Cir. 2008).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 994(w)(1)(B).
49. The actual form, known as A.O. 245B, also contains the judgment and accompanying
documents. A.O. 245b, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ao245b.pdf (last
visited Nov. 7, 2020). The United States Sentencing Commission approves the format, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 994(w)(1)(B).
50. See § 3553(a).
51. § 3553(b).
52. § 3553(c).
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determining a sentence,5 3 and therefore should never be a basis for
explaining a sentence. 4
The Guidelines' remaining guidance on explaining sentences
focuses on "departures" in language, which largely mirrors the
requirements of the SRA. Departures are a significant factor in federal
sentencing, with sentencing data from 2019 indicating that around fifty
5
percent of recent sentences were "within [the Guidelines] range,"
which means that around fifty percent were not. Among those departures
that were downward departures, about forty percent were based on
"substantial assistance."5 6 Commonly referenced departures in the
Guidelines include Section 5K.1.1 for "substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an
offense," 57 Section 5K.2.0 to account for aggravation and mitigation not
adequately addressed by the Guidelines, 58 and Section 4A.1.3 to address
offender-specific indications that the determined criminal history
"substantially
or
underrepresents"
"substantially
category
over-represents" the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history or
the defendant's risk of recidivism. 59
What is actually said on the record about departures remains within
the judge's discretion, subject to appellate review for sufficiency. 60 For a
Section 5K2.0 departure, for example, the Guidelines specify that if the
court departs from the applicable range, "it shall state .. . its specific
reasons for departure in open court at the time of sentencing and, with
limited exception in the case of statements received in camera, shall

53. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 28, § 5H1.10; see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(d).
54. Other characteristics, such as age, educational and vocational skills, mental and emotional
conditions, and family and community ties, may be proper for consideration. See GUIDELINES
MANUAL, supra note 28, § 5H1.1, .2, .3, .6.
55. FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS, supra note 17, at 7.
56. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS 84 tbl. 29 (2020), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-

and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2019/2019-Annual-Report-and-Sourcebook.pdf.
57. These are known as "5K1.1 departures" or "substantial assistance" and must be initiated
by the government. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 28, § 5K1.1; cf MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL, UNrrED STATES, R.C.M. 705(d)(5)(B) (2019) [hereinafter 2019 MCM]
(allowing, in military practice, upon recommendation of trial counsel and in exchange for
substantial assistance by the accused, for a plea agreement to provide for a sentence that is less than
the mandatory minimum for certain offenses). Similarly, a convening authority may reduce,
commute, or suspend a sentence in whole or in part based on substantial assistance by an accused
and upon the recommendation of the trial counsel. 2019 MCM, supra, R.C.M. 1109(e)(1)-(2).
58. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 28, § 5K2.0; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1).
59. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 28, § 4A1.3.
60. As one circuit court noted, "[m]ost of the cases that discuss a court's statement of reasons
concern such a statement in the context of departures." United States v. Parrado, 911 F.2d 1567,

1572 (11th Cir. 1990).
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state those reasons with specificity in the statement of reasons form." 61
Cases that involve the defendant's cooperation under Section 5K1.1, on
the other hand, often involve sealed filings and closed or obscured
hearings, in an effort to protect cooperators from violent retribution in
prison.62 Some courts may conduct a pro forma sidebar in every case,
with white noise broadcasted in the courtroom, to obscure the record as
to whether or not the defendant was a cooperator. 63 Likewise, the
Guidelines acknowledge that a judge must state her reasons for reducing
a sentence due to cooperation under Section 5K1.1, but clarify that
"[t]he court may elect to provide its reasons to the defendant in camera
and in writing under seal for the safety of the defendant or to avoid
disclosure of an ongoing investigation."6
Federal law does not require the sealing of the written SOR,
although as a practical matter "in the vast majority of districts [the SOR]
65
is a sealed part of the record and thus is not publicly accessible." Even
when the requirement to explain a sentence is clear, the dividing line
between what is said in open court versus what is included in the (often
sealed) SOR remains an area of judicial discretion. As a result, typically,
in cooperator cases, there remains a tension between the statutory
requirement to openly state the reasons for a sentence and the perceived
66
need to protect offenders from the reality that "snitches get stitches."
E.

Judicial Guidance on ExplainingSentences

Ever since the SRA came into law, court opinions have helped
refine what should and what must be explained on the record about a
sentence under the SRA and the Guidelines.

61.
62.

GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 28, § 5K2.0(e).
See D. Brock Homby, Can Federal Sentencing Remain Transparent?, JUDICATURE,

Spring 2019, at 46, 47-49. Judge Hornby, a federal district judge and former chief judge, describes
United States Sentencing Commission statistics which show that as many as one-third of cases in
some districts involve cooperation and the resultant pressure to seal or obscure part of the

sentencing record. Id. at 47, 51. As Judge Homby decries, "today's federal sentencing landscape"
includes everything from "courts where the courtroom is physically closed for any cooperation
discussion," to "courts where everything is done in open court," to many variations in between. Id.
at 49. "Pity," he concludes, "the journalist or citizen who seeks to know with certainty what
happened at a particular federal sentencing," at least if cooperation is a factor. Id.

63. Id. The authors noted such a practice during federal court sessions they observed.
64.
65.

GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 28, § 5K1.1 cmt. background.
FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS, supra note 17, at 11-12. As one federal court noted,

"Alone among [ninety-four] district courts, the District of Massachusetts routinely makes public the
statements of reasons behind its sentences." United States v. Jones, 762 F. Supp. 2d 270, 280 n.9 (D.
Mass. 2010).
66. Hornby, supra note 62, at 48.
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In Rita, the Supreme Court acknowledged the importance of the
SRA's requirement to "state in open court" the reasons for a sentence
but caveated that it
cannot read the statute (or our precedent) as insisting upon a full
opinion in every case. The appropriateness of brevity or length,
conciseness or detail, when to write, what to say, depends upon [the]
circumstances.... The law leaves much, in this respect, to the judge's
67
own professional judgment.

As Rita recognized, a sentence that is within both the statutory and
Guidelines range may require limited explanation, beyond stating that
the appropriate factors were considered. 68 But "[w]here the defendant or
prosecutor presents nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different
sentence . .. the judge will normally go further and explain why he has
rejected those arguments."6 9
Within this framework, the Court continued that the sentencing
judge should "set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court" that he (1)
considered the parties' arguments and (2) has a reasoned basis for his
decision. 70
Although the extent of necessary comment depends on the
circumstances of each case,7 1 the Court identified further benefits to
explaining a sentence: (1) to assure the public that the sentencing
process is reasoned,7 2 (2) to help sentencing guidelines evolve, 73 and (3)
to benefit the defendant himself.74

67.
68.
rests his
sentence
at 357.
69.
70.
71.

Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).
Id. at 356-57. As the Court stated, "Circumstances may well make clear that the judge
decision upon the Commission's own reasoning that the Guidelines sentence is a proper
. .. in the typical case, and that the judge has found that the case before him is typical." Id.
Id.
Id. at 356.
When addressing shortly after Rita, for example, how much to articulate on the record a

sentence that falls outside of the Guidelines, the Court echoed its earlier guidance: "We find it

uncontroversial that a major departure should be supported by a more significant justification than a
minor one. After settling on the appropriate sentence, [the judge] must adequately explain the
chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair
sentencing." Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007).
72. Rita, 551 U.S. at 357. As one federal judge explains:
While precedent under § 3553(a) does not require you to articulate each and every
sentencing factor, I generally try to do so anyway, even if briefly, to explain to all
parties present my thinking and why I am going to give the particularsentence.... I
often find, too, that the family and friends of a defendant (and sometimes the defendant
himself) don't appreciate the severity of the crime or the defendant's prior record.

Taking the time to explain that may at least help them to better understand the sentence. I
also articulate the sentencing guidelines, any applicable minimum-mandatory, and the
statutory maximum, and I try to explain what they mean.
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Appellate courts since the SRA likewise consistently interpret the
SOR as a required floor, but not a ceiling, as to what may be articulated
on the record. 75 To cite a few examples: In the view of the Eleventh
Circuit, "[s]ection 3553(a) does not require the district court to 'incant
specific language used in the guidelines' or 'articulate its consideration
of each individual § 3553(a) factor,' as long as the record reflects the
court's consideration of many of those factors." 76 The Second Circuit
affirms Rita's logic for explaining a sentence, both to ensure the
competence of the sentence and the confidence of the public, but
explains that what is adequate for ensuring that the judge considered the
arguments of parties and has a reasoned basis for the sentence
"necessarily depends on the circumstances." 77 The court clarified that
"we do not require 'robotic incantations' that the district court has
considered each of the § 3553(a) factors." 78 "When all is said and done,"
once the court is sure the judge reasonably exercised sentencing
discretion, "[the court] must defer heavily to the expertise of district
judges." 7 9 In the view of the Ninth Circuit, the SOR "must include a
discussion of the factors used to choose a particular sentence within the
sentencing range. These factors include individual considerations of
background, character, and conduct, as well as the systemic goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, and consistency in sentencing."" The Third

Timothy J. Corrigan, Who Appointed Me God? Reflections of a Judge on Criminal Sentencing,
JUDICATURE, Autumn 2016, at 25, 32.

73. Rita, 551 U.S. at 357-58.
74. Id. For example, addressing the defendant and explaining his sentence to him, and
encouraging him not to end up in this predicament again.
75. See, e.g., United States v. Ferguson, 518 F. App'x 458, 469 (6th Cir. 2013) (adopting the
Rita Court's breakdown of benefits to an adequate statement of reasons, as detailed above). As
Ferguson explained, assessing the adequacy of a judge's statement of reasons requires looking at
the "quality and content, not the quantity of the judge's words." Id. at 470.
76. United States v. Barriera-vera, 354 F. App'x 404, 410 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting United
States v. Bonilla, 463 F.3d 1176, 1182 (11th Cir. 2006)). The court in Barriera-Veracontinued that
"when determining whether a sentencing court's statement of reasons satisfies § 3553(c)(1), we are
not limited to reviewing the court's closing remarks, but review the entire sentencing as a whole."

Id. Echoing the Supreme Court's view in Rita that some cases may not need much explanation, the
Eleventh Circuit upheld the sufficiency of a sentence in a "cookie cutter" bank and credit card fraud

case, where the sentencing judge simply stated on the record that there was nothing unique about the
defendant's case; that there was a need for specific and general deterrence; that there were real
victims; and that there was a need for the defendant's sentence to be consistent with those of
similarly-situated defendants and offenses. United States v. Agbai, 497 F.3d 1226, 1230 (11th Cir.
2007).
77. United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 193 (2d Cir. 2008).
78. Id. (citing United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 113 (2d Cir. 2005)).
79. Id.
80. United States v. Upshaw, 918 F.2d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1990). In Upshaw, the Ninth Circuit
found inadequate, for a sentence subject to § 3553(c)(1), the court's summary remark that it "is not
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Circuit explained that "the district court must furnish an explanation
'sufficient for us to see that the particular circumstances of the case have
been given meaningful consideration within the parameters of
§ 3553(a)."' 81 Problems arise when the judge adopts a "personal
sentencing policy" apart from the statutory sentencing factors and fails
82
to account for a statutory sentencing factor that was directly at issue. In
adopting a "substance over form" approach when addressing an
explanation for an outside-of-Guidelines sentence, the Tenth Circuit
looks to the adequacy of the explanation itself, and not whether the
judge incorrectly describes the sentence as a "departure" rather than a
"variance."83
The Seventh Circuit broke down the issue of explaining a sentence
in an especially helpful way: What a judge must do, in essence, is
"discuss the application of the statutory factors to the defendant not in
checklist fashion but instead in the form of an adequate statement of the
judge's reasons, consistent with § 3553(a), for thinking the sentence he
has selected is indeed appropriate for the particular defendant." 84 What a
judge must not do is "import his own philosophy of sentencing if it is
85
inconsistent with [the § 3553(a) sentencing factors]." What a judge
may do but does not have to do, is consider that the statutory factors are
"vague and, worse perhaps, hopelessly open-ended," and "write a
comprehensive essay applying the full panoply of penological theories
and considerations, which is to say everything invoked or evoked by
section 3553(a)-to the case before him."86
So what should a federal sentencing judge absolutely not say? The
most obvious example, discussed above, is anything to suggest that the

going to sentence at the upper limits, but rather in the mid range in accordance with the court's
customary procedure in the matter." Id.

81. United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 216 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v.
Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 196 (3d. Cir. 2008)). In Merced, the Court of Appeals observed that the
judge, in struggling to arrive at an appropriate sentence and "career offender" determination for a

small-time drug dealer, engaged in an "on-one-hand-on-the-other hand dialectic several times
during the hearing," formally analyzed statutory sentencing factors at some length on the record,
and completed a written Statement of Reasons. Id. at 211-13. But "just as important as what the

Court said is what it did not say." Id. at 212.
82. Id. at 211, 216-17. Here, the statutory sentencing factor at issue was the need to avoid
unwarranted sentence disparities. Id. at 216.
83. United States v. Alapizco-Valenzuela, 546 F.3d 1208, 1222 (10th Cir. 2008). As the court
stated, "Here, where the court carefully enumerated all of the sentencing factors in § 3553(a), and
then went on to emphasize that those factors justified a higher-than-Guidelines sentence, we
conclude that the resulting sentence is a variance." Id.

84. United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005).
85. Id.
86. Id. The court here is making the point that the sentencing judge has considerable
discretion to go beyond the minimum requirement for explaining the sentence.
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judge improperly disregarded or overlooked mandatory sentencing
factors. Equally important would be anything to suggest that the judge
considered impermissible factors such as race, sex, national origin,
creed, religion, and socioeconomic status.8 7 Finally, it should go without
saying that certain remarks are out of bounds in any proceeding,
sentencing or otherwise, such as remarks that disparage a defendant or
other trial participant, 88 or suggest favoritism or bias.89
The overall takeaway of federal appellate opinions is consistent
with the SRA and Supreme Court guidance: Explanation on the record is
required, and while judges retain broad discretion, how much
explanation is enough turns on how much the sentence, and the stated
reasons for it, apply established sentencing guidance or deviate from that
guidance.
F.

SalutaryBenefits to Transparency

Apart from just making the record for the required sentencing
factors, courts can and often do address the defendant directly about the
sentence imposed-the "salutary purpose" the Supreme Court raised in
Rita.90 For example, a federal judge may express empathy toward a
defendant while explaining that his circumstances do not excuse his
conduct, admonish the defendant that the sentence reflects the
opportunity for the defendant to have a second chance after this sentence
is completed, or simply state that the judge hopes that the defendant will
never have to appear before her again. 91 One court explained the benefits

87. See, e.g., United States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577, 585 (2d Cir. 1994) (vacating the sentence
based on at least the appearance that the defendant's ethnicity and alien status played a role in
determining the sentence, when the judge had remarked on the record, in part, that "[w]e have
enough home-grown criminals in the United States without importing them," and "[t]he purpose of

my sentence here is to punish the defendant and to generally deter others, . . . and if people want to
come to the United States they had better abide by our laws").
88. See, e.g., United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 386-91 (7th Cir. 1972). The court
found that the sarcasm and demeanor of the judge and prosecutors in the case would warrant
reversal if reversal had not otherwise been warranted. Id.

89. But, as the Supreme Court clarified, a judge need not be recused for bias or prejudice
simply because he is "exceedingly ill disposed towards the defendant, who has been shown to be a

thoroughly reprehensible person." Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550-51 (1994). One circuit
court applied this principle, for example, to hold that a judge calling the defendant a "con man" and
stating that "[he has] seen armed robbers who were less cruel" did not amount to recusal-worthy

bias. United States v. Roberts, 54 F. App'x 473, 475-76 (6th Cir. 2003); see also United States v.
Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 997, 1005 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that the judge's "testy" comments did not
warrant recusal for bias).

90.

Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357 (2007) ("Often at sentencing a judge will speak at

length to a defendant, and this practice may indeed serve a salutary purpose.").

91.

The authors observed comments similar to these in federal sentencing sessions. And as
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of addressing the defendant: "An uninformed defendant is likely to be an
embittered defendant. An informed defendant may be more accepting of
the sentence and embark upon it more willing to work towards a
law-abiding future." 92 All of these comments, in appropriate measure,
can have a significant impact on what is likely to be one of the most
significant events in the defendant's life.
III.

COURT-MARTIAL SENTENCE TRANSPARENCY

While federal sentencing transparency is still subject to
considerable judicial discretion (and voluminous appellate review), the
fact remains that federal law mandates that the reasons for a sentence be
stated in open court. In contrast, the Uniform Code of Military Justice
93
("UCMJ"), while providing mandatory factors to consider, neither
prescribes nor prohibits transparency in sentencing. The trend, however,
is the direction of sentence transparency, and military judges have the
tools available now to appropriately explain a sentence within legal
boundaries. 94
There is still an unmistakable cultural reluctance within the armed
forces trial judiciary to deviate from the bare requirement to announce a
sentence without elaboration. The few appellate examples of judges'
comments gone wrong are a major contributor to this chilling effect. But
when analyzed holistically, current military case law offers more than
enough guidance for military judges to safely stay within permissible
boundaries when explaining a sentence. To not do so is a missed
opportunity to bolster confidence in military justice by making sentences
as transparent and understandable as possible. Furthermore, empirical
observation suggests that today's military judges, armed with existing
guidelines, if encouraged by a culture that endorses measured
transparency in explaining sentences, are willing and able to do so.

one federal judge put it:
Don't underestimate how much what you say and how you say it during a sentencing
hearing matters. Offer victims, whose lives may have been devastated, sympathy and

hope. Be empathetic to defendants' families who oftentimes are living a nightmare.
There is nothing inconsistent with imposing a just sentence and trying to encourage a
defendant to do better.
Corrigan, supra note 72, at 31.

92. United States v. Ferguson, 518 F. App'x 458, 469 (6th Cir. 2013).
93. UCMJ art. 56, 10 U.S.C. § 856(c).
94. See infra Section III.B.
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Court-MartialSentencing in a Nutshell

The UCMJ is the overarching statute passed by Congress that
provides for a system of justice within the armed forces. 95 The UCMJ is
codified within Title 10 of the United States Code and establishes the
fundamentals of the military justice system, including court-martial
jurisdiction and composition, pre-trial and trial procedure, appellate
review processes, and the punitive articles themselves. 96 Except for any
maximum or mandatory punishments specifically prescribed by
Congress, 97 Article 36 of the UCMJ authorizes the President of the
United States to set the punishments for offenses under the UCMJ. 98
Similar to the pre-Guidelines federal sentencing regime, there are
typically wide ranges between the Presidentially-prescribed minimum
and maximum terms of confinement for offenses under the UCMJ, with
broad discretion by military judges and sentencing members to arrive at
a sentence anywhere within that range. 99 Article 36 of the UCMJ also
authorizes the President of the United States to establish procedural rules
for courts-martial, including rules for the sentencing process. 100 These
rules are published by Executive Order as the Rules for Courts-Martial
("RCM"). The UCMJ and the RCM are two of the major components of
the Manual for Courts-Martial ("MCM"), the primary reference manual
used by military justice practitioners.101
Unlike the federal system in which the judge always imposes the
sentence, sentencing by a military judge in courts-martial is only by
default.10 2 If an accused elects to be tried by members and is found
guilty of any offense, he has the option of electing sentencing by
military judge or sentencing by members. 103 Courts-martial sentencing
95. Pub. L. No. 81-506, 64 Stat. 107 (1950) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946).
96. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946.
97. For example, premeditated murder under Article 118 of the UCMJ includes a statutory
maximum punishment of death and a statutory minimum punishment of confinement. UCMJ art.

118, 10 U.S.C. § 918. A conviction for rape or sexual assault under Article 120 of the UCMJ,
requires a mandatory minimum punishment of dismissal for the service for officers, or a
dishonorable discharge for enlisted members. UCMJ art. 120, 10 U.S.C. § 856(b).
98. See 10 U.S.C. § 836(a).
99.

For example, deserting one's unit without any aggravating circumstances has a potential

confinement range of anywhere from zero days to two years; willfully disobeying a superior
commissioned officer not in time of war has a potential confinement range of zero days to five
years; and unpremeditated murder has a potential confinement range of zero days to life. 2019
MCM, supra note 57, pt. IV, ¶ 9.d(2)(b), ¶ 16.d(2), ¶ 56.d(2).
100. § 836(a).
101. 2019 MCM, supra note 57.
102. UCMJ art. 53, 10 U.S.C. § 853(b)(1)(A); see Vowell, supra note 1, at 105-06.
103. § 853(b)(1)(B); 2019 MCM, supra note 57, R.C.M. 1002(b). This sentencing-only election
applies to courts-martial in which all specifications allege offenses committed on or after January 1,
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usually proceeds immediately after findings, typically the same day. The
military system has no probation or probation officers and no PSR is
prepared; all evidence or information that is to be used for sentencing is
presented in open court as part of an adversarial proceeding.104 Any
105
as well as the
victim who has suffered direct impact from an offense,
1
accused, 06 has a right of allocution, typically made in the form of an
unsworn statement. After arguments by both sides on an appropriate
sentence, the court will close to deliberate, in chambers for a judge-alone
case or in the deliberation room among members only for a memberssentencing case. 107 During closed-session deliberations, the military
judge or members will consider any evidence introduced during the
sentencing phase of trial, as well as evidence introduced during the
merits phase of trial. 108 Deliberating on a sentence can take anywhere
from minutes to hours. In a members case, any member may propose a
sentence after deliberations, and members vote on the sentence by secret
written ballot. 109 The members will typically use a sentence worksheet,
prepared by the prosecution and agreed to by the defense, to record the
sentence imposed." 0 This sentence worksheet reflects the sentence itself
only, not any reasons behind the sentence, and is marked as an appellate
exhibit for inclusion in the record. Judges may also use their own
sentence worksheets as an aid in chambers, though judge-alone
worksheets are not attached to the trial record because the judge's
announcement of the sentence is, itself, the record. Under procedures

2019. See Exec. Order No. 13825, § 10, 83 Fed. Reg. 9889 (Mar. 1, 2018). An accused charged both
with offense(s) allegedly committed before January 1, 2019, and offenses allegedly committed after
January 1, 2019, also has the option to opt-in to these new sentencing provisions. See 2019 MCM,
supra note 57, R.C.M. 902A.
104. The primary procedural rule for court-martial sentencing, in fact, "allows the presentation
of much of the same information to the court-martial as would be contained in a presentence report,
but it does so within the protections of an adversarial proceeding, to which rules of evidence
apply .. . although they may be relaxed for some purposes." MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL,
UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 1001 analysis at A21-71 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 MCM]. This rule also
specifically incorporates "[a]ny evidence properly introduced on the merits before findings." 2019
MCM, supra note 57, R.C.M. 1001(g)(2). What sentencing evidence is actually considered, then,
depends entirely on the presentations of the parties during the merits and presentencing phases of
the trial.

105. See 2019 MCM, supra note 57, R.C.M. 1001(c).
106. See 2019 MCM, supra note 57, R.C.M.

1001(d)(2).

The term "accused"

is

interchangeable with the term "defendant" used in federal civilian practice.

107. In military practice, issuing a decision from the bench, without first closing court to
deliberate, is the exception rather than the rule. See, e.g., United States v. Mack, 9 M.J. 300, 304
(C.M.A. 1980).
108. 2019 MCM, supra note 57, R.C.M. 1001(a)-(g).
109. UCMJ art. 51, 10 U.S.C. § 851(a).
110. See DA PAM. 27-9, supra note 9, paras. 2-5-19, 2-6-7.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol49/iss1/4

16

Martin and Hayes: Court-Martial Sentences: Time for More Transparency

2020]

COURT-MARTIAL SENTENCES: TIME FOR MORE TRANSPARENCY

79

revised as of 2019,1" the military judge announces the sentence
regardless of whether the sentence was determined by the judge or

members. 1 2
B.

Sentence TransparencyPursuantto Article 56 of the UCMJ and the
Upcoming UCMJ Guidelines

Military law has never expressly prohibited explaining a sentence.
Although specific statutory or regulatory guidance on this point remains
thin, recent developments tend toward transparency. Specifically, Article
56 of the UCMJ, recently amended by the Military Justice Act of
2016,13 gives military judges a reliable starting framework to articulate
their sentences.
The recently-amended Article 56 of the UCMJ lays out by statute,
for the first time, that the sentencing authority "shall impose punishment
that is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to promote justice and
to maintain good order and discipline in the armed forces, taking into
consideration" the following:
(A) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the accused; (B) the impact of the offense on (i) the
financial, social, psychological, or medical well-being of any victim of
the offense; and (ii) the mission, discipline, or efficiency of the
command of the accused and any victim of the offense; (C) the need
for the sentence (i) to reflect the seriousness of the offense; (ii) to
promote respect for the law; (iii) to provide just punishment for the
offense; (iv) to promote adequate deterrence of misconduct; (v) to
protect others from further crimes by the accused; (vi) to rehabilitate
the accused; and (vii) to provide, in appropriate cases, the opportunity
for retraining and return to duty to meet the needs of the service; and
(D) the sentences available under this chapter. 1 1 4

Although the recently-amended Article 56 adds nothing new to
existing military practice or case law, it marks the first time under the
UCMJ that these principles were systematically codified. Keeping in
mind the current absence of sentencing guidelines in the UCMJ, the
revised Article 56 practically mirrors the statutory sentencing factors in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)-with the notable addition of the requirement to

111. See Exec. Order No. 13825, 83 Fed. Reg. 9889, 10012-14, 10023 (Mar. 1, 2018).
112. See 2019 MCM, supra note 57, R.C.M. 1007(b)(1)-(2).
113. See Military Justice Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 5301, 130 Stat. 2894, 2919-21
(2016) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 856).
114. 10 U.S.C. § 856(c); see also 2019 MCM, supra note 57, R.C.M. 1002(f)(1)-(4).
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maintain good order and discipline in the military system."1 5 Each courtmartial sentence is presumed to be reflective of these Article 56 factors,
although without a judge explaining her sentence, there is no way of
knowing what the judge considered. Regardless of the forum, the same
sentencing factors and guidance controls.116
Further, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2020"' requires the Secretary of Defense to develop nonbinding
sentence guidelines to provide the sentencing authority with a suggested
range of punishments, including suggested ranges of confinement, that
will "generally be appropriate" for UCMJ offenses." 8 Analogous to the
data analysis that helped shape the federal Guidelines, the UCMJ
guidelines must take into account sentencing data collected by the
Military Justice Review Panel.1 9 Although there is no explicit mention
of a requirement to state the reasons for a sentence, to do so would be a
logical follow-on to demonstrate why a particular sentence falls within
the recommended range, which would be helpful to reviewing courts just
as it is helpful in the federal system. Plus, the very idea of UCMJ
guidelines is consistent with the concerns behind the federal Guidelines
of maintaining transparency and consistency.40 Giving the reasons for a
sentence would only further this purpose.
Although it will be some time until the first UCMJ sentencing
guidelines are issued,"' there is no reason for military judges to wait
until then to articulate their sentences. In fact, courts-martial have

115. Compare § 856(c), with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
116. 2019 MCM, supra note 57, R.C.M. 1002(f).
117. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, 133 Stat.
1198 (2019).
118. Id. § 537(a).
119. Id. § 537(b); MIL. JUST. REv. GRP., REPORT OF THE MILITARY JUSTICE REVIEW GROUP,
PART I: UCMJ RECOMMENDATIONS 31-32 (2015), https://www.jag.navy.mil/documents/NJS/MJRG

_ReportPartI_22Dec15.pdf (comparing the data analysis of sentencing data in the Federal civilian
system to the military justice system).
120. After already incorporating recommendations for segmented sentencing in judge-alone
cases in the Military Justice Act of 2016, the proposal for non-binding guidelines under the UCMJ
appears to be yet another incremental adoption of recommendations by the Military Justice Review
Group ("MJRG"). See id. at 503-15 (discussing amendments to Article 56 and other related articles
of the UCMJ). The MJRG closely analyzed federal sentencing and guidelines in crafting their
proposals to amend the UCMJ. See id. at 470-75.
121. The Secretary of Defense has until one year after the Military Justice Review Panel
("MJRP") submits its first report to submit guidelines to the Senate and House Armed Services
Committees, together with an assessment of the "feasibility and advisability of implementing such
guidelines in panel sentencing cases." National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020,
Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 537(c)-(d), 133 Stat. 1198, 1363 (2019). As to the underlying data, the MJRP
is tasked during fiscal year 2020 to gather and analyze sentencing data from courts-martial, with
that data to be included in a more comprehensive military justice assessment to be conducted in
fiscal year 2021. See UCMJ art. 146, 10 U.S.C. § 946(a), (f)(1)-(2).
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always allowed judges to do so, and existing guidance offers more than
enough clarity for military judges to advance the goals of sentence
transparency now, without running afoul of necessary constraints.
C.

Rules-Based Guidance on Court-Martial Sentences

In terms of rules-based guidance, the first MCM, promulgated close
in time to the UCMJ's inception, specifically authorized a court-martial
to include in the record "[fjor the information of the convening
authority ... a brief statement of the reasons for the sentence." 122 That
provision was later eliminated, 3 but the drafters' analysis specifically
noted that the deletion was targeted toward members' findings only and
that a military judge sitting alone could still provide reasons for his or
her decision.1" However, any impermissible considerations in these
comments may be reviewed on appeal under an abuse of discretion

standard. 125
The RCM offer just a little more guidance on what goes into
making a sentence but fall short of requiring open explanation. RCM
1003 and 1004 prescribe the authorized punishments for non-capital and
capital cases, respectively. 126 RCM 1005 requires the military judge to
provide sentencing instructions to the members prior to their
deliberations, 127 and RCM 1006 provides guidance to the members on
deliberations and voting. 128 RCM 1007 provides guidance on the
announcement of the sentence.1 2 9 In member sentencing, this guidance is
limited to a reading of the sentence. 0 Beginning in 2019, in judge-alone
sentencing cases, the judge must further delineate the amount of
confinement or fine, if any, for each specification of an offense, and
whether the terms of confinement will run concurrently or consecutively

122.
123.

176b(4)

(1951).
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES
Compare id., with MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES

¶ 76b(4) (1969)

[hereinafter 1969 MCM].
124. U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, PAM. 27-2, ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS: MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1969, REVISED EDITION ¶¶ 74f(4), 76b(4) (Jul. 1970); see also

United States v. Green, 64 M.J. 289, 290-91 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (noting that the provision "was
deleted to remove the potential for improper command influence that might flow if court-martial
panel members felt obligated to justify the panel's decision to a convening authority," and that the

change "was not intended to preclude the military judge, in a bench trial, from setting forth reasons
for the judge's decision").
125. See United States v. McDonald, 55 M.J. 173, 178 (C.A.A.F. 2001).
126. See 2019 MCM, supra note 57, R.C.M. 1003, 1004.
127. Id. R.C.M. 1005.
128. Id. R.C.M. 1006.
129. Id. R.C.M. 1007.
130. Id. R.C.M. 1007(b)(1).
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with any other terms of confinement.1 31 In the closest the rules come to
an actual explanation, a judge who recommends suspension of a punitive
discharge or confinement in excess of six months must include "a
statement explaining the basis for the suspension recommendation" in
the written Statement of Trial Results.132 This is the sum total of
guidance on explaining a sentence in military courts.
D. DeliberativeProcess and Appellate Scrutiny

'

One reason military judges hesitate to reveal the reasons behind
either their findings or sentence is concern about protecting the
deliberative process. In members cases, panel members may not be
polled about their deliberations except when inquiry is permitted by
judicial order in an attempt to cure the improper consideration of
extraneous prejudicial information, unlawful command influence or
other improper outside influence of members, or a mistake in the
announcement of findings or sentence. 133 A military judge's
deliberations are similarly protected, to the extent privileged in trials of
criminal cases in the United States district courts.1 34 Military judges are
openly discouraged from revealing their deliberative process.
Moreover, the military's highest appellate court, the Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces ("CAAF"), has warned that if judges choose to
reveal their deliberative process, they run the risk of losing their
presumptive knowledge of the law.1 36

131. Id. R.C.M. 1007(b)(2). These requirements were part of the Military Justice Act of 2016,
which is contained in Division E of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017,
which went into effect on January 1, 2019. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, 130 Stat. 2000, 2894 (2016).
132. 2019 MCM, supra note 57, R.C.M. 1109(f). The Statement of Trial Results is a working
document signed by the military judge immediately after trial for confinement and other post-trial
processing, but before judgment is formally entered in the case. See id. R.C.M. 1101. Under the
UCMJ, the convening authority, not the military judge, acts on any recommended suspension. Id.
R.C.M. 1107(b)(1)-(2).
133. 2019 MCM, supra note 57, MIL. R. EVID. 606(b)(2).
134. 2019 MCM, supra note 57, MIL. R. EvID. 509. Military Rules of Evidence ("MRE") 509
states that the exceptions in MRE 606 for polling members extends to military judges as well. Id.
However, in 2006 the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (the "CAAF") clarified that MRE
606(b) does not apply to military judges. See United States v. Hill, 62 M.J. 271, 274 (C.A.A.F.
2006). On the issue of deliberative process, the CAAF has definitively stated that deliberative
privilege applies to military judges and that their deliberative process is not subject to review. See
United States v. Matthews, 68 M.J. 29, 42 (C.A.A.F. 2009).
135. See, e.g., United States v. Jimenez-Victoria, 75 M.J. 768, 769 n.2 (A. Ct. Crim. App.
2016) (opining that a military judge would "overstep[ ] the bounds" if he revealed his deliberate
thought process in a post-trial feedback session with counsel and reiterating the guidance of the
Code of Judicial Conduct for Army Trial and Appellate Judges and the United States Army Trial
Judiciary Standing Operating Procedures regarding the protection of the deliberative process).
136. See United States v. Mason, 45 M.J. 483, 484 (C.A.A.F. 1997) ("[M]ilitary judges are
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It is possible for a military judge to provide factual bases for a
sentence without revealing the deliberative process. A key holding for
the distinction between revealing factual observations and the
deliberative process was the CAAF's 2009 decision in United States v.
Matthews. 3 ? The CAAF held in Matthews that the then-existing version
of Military Rules of Evidence ("MRE") 509 included an implied
privilege that protected the deliberative process of military judges. 138
Matthews explored United States Supreme Court and lower federal court
precedent about what a judge may and may not be compelled to testify
to, and found that "[t]he most common line of demarcation is between
factual testimony and testimony about a judge's deliberative process. "139
The Matthews court continued on to say that "[w]hile a judge may testify
'to the extent [the testimony] contains personal knowledge of historical
facts or expert opinion[,]' a court may not consider testimony in which a
judge explains his reasoning and deliberative process for reaching a
decision."140
This distinction is useful to sentence explanations as well. While it
certainly is possible to blur the lines between thought processes and
explaining a sentencing outcome, a military judge who limits his
comments to what was factually observed on the open record runs little
risk of running afoul of any provision. The cautionary examples in
appellate case law often involve sua sponte disclosure by a judge of
improper sentencing considerations that the judge relied on. A
methodical approach to explaining a sentence can greatly reduce this
concern.
E.

MilitaryAppellate Courts' Guidance on Explaining a Sentence

Although far fewer than the number of appellate opinions in federal
courts, there are nearly fifty years of precedent by the military courts in
addressing the left and right limits of commenting on a court-martial

presumed to know the law and to follow it, absent clear evidence to the contrary."). Included in this
presumptive knowledge of the law is that "the military judge is able to distinguish between proper

and improper sentencing arguments." United States v. Erickson, 65 M.J. 221, 225 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
137. 68 M.J. 29 (C.A.A.F. 2009).
138. Id. at 30, 36, 38; see also 2016 MCM, supra note 104, MIL. R. EvID. 509 analysis at
A22-50 (explaining that Matthews led to the amendment of MRE 509 into its current form, which
expressly includes military judges).
139. Matthews, 68 M.J. at 39.
140. Id. (second and third alterations in original) (quoting washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d
1243, 1263 (5th Cir. 1982)). As MRE 509 now provides, the deliberations of courts and military
judges are privileged, but not the results of those deliberations. 2019 MCM, supra note 57, MIL. R.
EVID. 509.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2020

21

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 4

84

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 49:63

sentence. Although no single opinion comprehensively addresses the
issue, collective analysis of what military courts have said about
commenting on a sentence yields a healthy amount of guidance that is
also remarkably consistent with Article 56 of the UCMJ. Addressing
these opinions chronologically shows how military thought has
progressed in this area.
Nearly fifty years ago in United States v. Hill,141 the United States
Court of Military Appeals ("CMA"), the CAAF's predecessor, sustained
a sentence as reassessed by the intermediate appellate court precisely
because the trial judge had "set out his reasons for imposing the sentence
he did." 2 The intermediate court found, and the CMA agreed, that
errors by the trial judge had improperly weighed on the original
sentence, including his apparent desire to send a warning to others when
he told the accused after announcing the sentence, "Now you take that
message back to those other pushers."14 3 Although this comment
deviated from the judge's obligation to give each accused
"individualized consideration"" for sentencing, the CMA found that the
intermediate court nonetheless had a sufficient factual basis to correct
these errors through a sentence reassessment because the judge had
provided ample reasons on the record for his sentence, including that he
disbelieved that the accused "was the kindhearted, ingenuous and
concerned Marine that he represented himself to be" and rather believed
that the accused was a "pusher" for minor profit.'4 5 Importantly, the
Court found that "[a]dmissible evidence amply supports each of the
reasons listed by the judge."" While Hill should be read for the
proposition that a judge's sentencing comments are subject to appellate
scrutiny, and that comments revealing inappropriate considerations will
be remedied, it also illustrates that sentencing comments that are focused

141. 44 C.M.R. 257 (C.M.A. 1972).
142. Id. at 262.
143. Id. at 260.
144. Id. at 260 (quoting United States v. Mamaluy, 10 C.M.A. 102, 106 (1959)). As Hill noted,
although the record supported "beyond all doubt" that the accused was in fact a "pusher" of heroin,
that fact "did not make him accountable for others engaged in the same act." Id. at 260-61. The Hill
court also affirmed the "basic concept in sentencing that punishment not only fit the crime, but be
responsive to the character, the background, and potential for rehabilitation of the particular
accused." Id. at 261 (citing United States v. McCoy, 429 F.2d 739, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1970)). The Hill
decision also reflects a time when the CMA was applying particular scrutiny to the concept of
general deterrence. As the CMA explained several years later in reference to Mamaluy and Hill:
"Both of these cases stress the need for clear guidance to the sentencing authority to render an
individualized sentence, yet neither prohibits reliance upon the concept of general deterrence.
Instead, they prohibit punishment of an accused for the acts of others, rather than for his own
illegalities or misconduct." United States v. Varacalle, 4 M.J. 181, 183 n.9 (C.M.A. 1978).
145. Hill, 44 C.M.R. at 260, 262.
146. Id.
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on the accused and relevant considerations, and are supported by facts in
the record, can help uphold a result.
Over thirty years later, the CAAF had occasion to fmd that
comments on a sentence made by a judge outside of court are also
subject to review. In United States v. McNutt,1 47 the CAAF found
prejudicial error when a military judge voluntarily disclosed, after trial
and during an out-of-court advocacy feedback session with counsel,14 8
that he had adjusted the accused's sentence ten days upward because he
considered, during deliberations, the administrative policy of
confinement facilities to grant monthly credit for "good-time" served. 14 9
The CAAF found the error prejudicial because the judge had improperly
considered the "collateral administrative effect of the good-time policy"
in arriving at the sentence. 50 o This case is a bit of a red herring, however,
because the concerns in McNutt centered around out-of-court disclosures
by a judge that he had considered inadmissible matters in adjudging a
sentence-understandably a problem under any sentencing regime, and
the exact opposite of the intended goal behind openly explaining
properly-applied sentencing factors.151 Nothing in McNutt discusses a
judge's comments on the record, which is undoubtedly where any such
comments should be. Arguably, it is good that the judge in McNutt
revealed the flaws in his reasoning because it enabled appropriate relief.
Armed with the right guidance, a judge can constrain his comments both
on and off the record to within appropriate boundaries and avoid the
concerns raised by McNutt.
Shortly after McNutt, the CAAF in United States v. Green5 2
distinguished that while a judge may properly address matters raised by
the accused, a "military judge may not interject his or her personal
beliefs into the sentencing process."15 3 The CAAF opened its opinion by
recognizing that a judge may state the reasons for his decision and
reiterating that "[i]f the military judge comments on the sentence, the
remarks may be reviewed on appeal to determine whether the military

147. 62 M.J. 16 (C.A.A.F. 2005).
148. Such are often referred to as "Bridging the Gap" sessions. See id. at 17 n.l. McNutt
continues to be discussed as a case of concern among military judges when deciding whether the
benefits of these post-trial advocacy improvement sessions with counsel outweigh the risks of
inadvertently revealing something inappropriate. Much like when explaining a sentence, the most
obvious takeaway is that the key is to only make appropriate comments, not to avoid comments
altogether.
149. See id. at 17.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 19-20, 22-23.
152. 64 M.J. 289 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
153. Id. at 293 (citing United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 740-41 (4th Cir. 1991)).
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judge relied on inadmissible matter in determining the sentence.""4 The
Green court took no issue with the judge explaining to the accused "why
5
[it] think[s] the sentence is appropriate for [him]," prior to issuing it.
The judge "began with a description of basic sentencing principles,
including rehabilitation, punishment, protection of society, preservation
of good order and discipline in the military, and deterrence," and further
noted that "the weight I give any or all of these along with the other
156
sentencing matters in this case, rest[s] solely within my discretion."
The judge then commented on "the harm [a]ppellant's actions caused his
victims, his family, and the Army," and described the accused as "a
predator" who "operated 'in secret."" 7 Three religious or quasireligious references by the military judge are what drew an objection and
appellate review.158 First, the judge noted "[s]ome of the documents I've
seen describe you as God fearing, strong in your belief in God. The last
time I looked there were [ten] commandments. Apparently one of those,
159
which addresses your actions, you must have missed in the reading."
Then, in characterizing the accused's crimes as betraying the trust of his
family and the Army, the judge noted "[y]ou do unto others as you
1 60
Finally, in
would expect to be treated. That's the golden rule."
explaining that the accused's actions "'weren't mistakes, these were
choices,"' the judge continued on to say:
Every choice in life has a repercussion. It kind of reminds me of an old
Charlie Daniels saying from a country music song. "You know what
the problem in the world today is? People done gone and put their
Bibles away. They're living by the law of the jungle, not the law of the

land." 16 1
Considering these references independently and as a whole, the
Green court found that the sentencing judge did not abuse his discretion
or exhibit judicial bias by use of these incidental religious references,
subject to significant caveats: First, that the judge's sentence was far
below the maximum possible punishment and did not "reflect prejudicial
consideration of extraneous factors;" 162 second, the defense had been the
first to interject the subject of religion in the presentencing case, both

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 291 (citing United States v. Hill, 62 M.J. 271, 274-75 (C.A.A.F. 2006)).
Id. at 292.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
See id. at 292-93.
Id. at 292.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 292-93.
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through a character letter and the accused's unsworn statement; 63 third,
the military judge had "expressly stated that he would not consider the
appellant's fealty to his religious tenets as a sentencing factor;" 16 4 fourth,
the defense did not object to the judge's remarks;1 65 and finally, "the
military judge's sentencing remarks primarily discussed appropriate
sentencing considerations, with incidental references to religion."166 In
what is a useful takeaway for the right way to approach sentencing
comments, the court concluded that "[t]he military judge's comments in
their entirety evoked established sentencing principles and tied those
principles to [a]ppellant's actions and the effect of those actions on his
victims, his family, and the Army." 167 The court concluded by stating,
"In light of the military judge's sentencing statement as a whole and the
context of his references to religion, we conclude that if the military
judge erred, any error was harmless." 168
Religious comment by a judge, even in response to issues raised by
the defense, is undoubtedly a touchy subject that is perhaps best avoided.
Even considering the religious references that were made, Green serves
as a reminder that a judge has considerable discretion in her comments
when those comments are carefully tailored to the matters actually
before the court. Aside from the religious references, Green is a useful
framework for explaining a sentence by evoking "established sentencing
principles" and tying those principles to the circumstances of the case.1 69
F.

Service Appellate Courts on Explaining a Sentence

Notable decisions by the military's highest appellate court affirm
the general principle that a military judge may comment on a sentence,
subject to appellate scrutiny, and that appropriate comments may
actually be helpful in demonstrating that the judge relied on proper

163. See id. at 291-93. As the court noted,
[A]n accused . . may attempt to convince the military judge that his or her religious
practices and beliefs demonstrate repentance and readiness for rehabilitation. When the
accused does so, the military judge may properly take into account the credibility and
context of the accused's statement. The military judge must ensure that the evidence is

considered for the appropriate purpose, and that the military judge does not interject his
or her personal religious beliefs into the sentencing process.

Id. at 293 (citations omitted).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 294.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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considerations when a sentencing determination is challenged. Among
70
the lower military service appellate courts,1 the relatively few cases on
the issue likewise suggest that the real concern is not with the concept
itself of explaining a sentence, but with when the military judge's
comments reveal errors in the law or matters that were inappropriately
considered to begin with.
In a case that predates the CMA's decision in Hill, the Army
appellate court found error and reassessed the sentence when a judge's
7
comments on the sentence were proper yet incomplete.' ' The court took
no issue with the sentencing judge commenting on the seriousness of the
convicted housebreaking offense; that the offense could have serious
consequences in spite of the battalion commander's offering of an
"Article 15" nonjudicial punishment 172 for the closely-related larceny
arising from the same incident; that the accused had a relatively clean
record; and that he was recommending suspension of the punitive
discharge.1'7 3 The problem was that the sentencing judge did not specify,
as the MCM required, that he had directly considered that the accused
had already received nonjudicial punishment for the related larceny "in
74
The issue
determining the measure of punishment to be adjudged."'
was clearly not that the judge commented on the sentence; it was that his
comments revealed that he had omitted a necessary consideration when
explaining the sentence.'
In United States v. Stevens,1 76 the Army Court of Military Review
held, unsurprisingly, that a judge errs when he considers information that
should not have been considered.' 77 In Stevens, the accused was
convicted by a military judge and sentenced for larceny and wrongful
disposition of a half-pound of the explosive trinitrotoluene ("TNT")

170. The Army, Air Force, Navy/Marines, and Coast Guard each have a Court of Criminal
Appeals, composed of judge advocates appointed by the respective services, as the first level of
military appellate review and with the authority to act on the findings and sentence. See UCMJ art.
66, 10 U.S.C. § 866.
171. United States v. Oliver, 44 C.M.R. 384, 385-86 (A.C.M.R. 1971).
172. Punishment under Article 15 of the UCMJ stems from a commander-imposed, nonjudicial
proceeding that is used for relatively minor offenses. Under both Article 15 of the UCMJ and the
MCM, the fact that the accused had been punished for an offense arising from the same act or
omission must be considered when imposing a sentence for the related offense at the court-martial.
Id. at 385-86; see 10 U.S.C. § 815(f); see also 1969 MCM, supra note 123, ch. XXVI, 1 128.b.
173. Oliver, 44 C.M.R. at 385-86.
174. Id. at 386.
175. See id. More recent military case law also requires a military judge to state on the record
the specific credit to be awarded for prior nonjudicial punishment, even if she does not otherwise
explain the sentence. See United States v. Gammons, 51 M.J. 169, 184 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
176. 21 M.J. 649 (A.C.M.R. 1985).
177. Id.
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while assigned in Panama. 178 Although the TNT at issue did not explode
(the accused had tried to detonate it as part of a prank), the Stevens court
found no error in the judge's sentence explanation as to the serious
injury that could have occurred because this possible injury was a
reasonable inference based on the evidence presented at trial. 1 9 The
judge erroneously went too far, however, when he speculated that an
explosion and injury, had it occurred, might have soured relations
between the United States and Panama.1 80 By wading into pure
speculation and an improperly-placed concern as to the possible impact
of the accused's actions on foreign relations, the military judge went
beyond sentencing the accused for the offenses he committed. 181 "We
hold," the court stated, "that error results when a trial judge
acknowledges consideration of matters in arriving at a sentence where
such matters, if presented before court members by counsel during
argument, would have constituted prejudicial error." 8 2 When a judge
speculates "beyond the outer limits of reasonable inferences to be drawn
from the evidence presented at trial," that speculation will warrant
review and potential reversal.183
84
The published opinion of United States v. Russell"
is a rare
example of a military appellate opinion that centers entirely around the
judge's comments prior to announcing the sentence.' 85 Based on a fatal
shooting of five other service members while the accused was deployed
to Iraq, the accused faced sentencing for aggravated assault, attempted
premeditated murder, and five specifications of premeditated murder. 186
In what was no doubt a difficult trial for all involved, the judge's
comments prior to sentencing are worth repeating here:
Like everyone, I have great compassion for the victims of Sergeant
Russell's crimes. I have never been so grieved as I have been by
learning of the impact of Sergeant Russell's crimes on the lives of so
many, including his own family. They are indelible, unchangeable, and

178. Id. at 650.
179. Id. at 652.
180.

Id. at 653. As the court noted, "It is well established in military jurisprudence that an

attempt to lure the trier of fact into basing its verdict upon the probable effect of the outcome of the
court-martial on relations between the military and civilian communities will constitute prejudicial
error." Id.
181. See id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 652-53.
184. 76 M.J. 855 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2017).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 856-57.
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of an indescribable magnitude. Sergeant Russell, I want you to know
that I have compassion for you. I have anguished over both the
findings and the sentence I am about to impose. No person is fully
defined by his behavior at a moment in time. I know from your fellow
soldiers, your sisters, your brother-in-law, your son, your mother, and
your wife, that you have capacity for good. You have endured much in
your life, including some things that only soldiers must endure. And I
know that good has resided in you.
You also have enormous capacity for evil, as great an evil as human
beings are capable of possessing. As for the debate between the
prosecution and the defense as to whether every person categorically is
or is not capable of committing a certain act, in your case, that subject
is not a matter of debate. I agree with you, Sergeant Russell, you are
not a monster, but you have knowingly and deliberatively done
incredibly monstrous things. You bear the full responsibility of your
decisions and your actions; and I am obligated to adjudicate the
consequences. And you must, and I believe that you will, accept those
consequences.
Sergeant Russell, you have forced many to drink from a bitter cup, and
187
that includes this court. That cup is now before you.

Significantly, given the wide range of the judge's comments, the
Army Court of Criminal Appeals found no error. The Russell court
opened its analysis by affirming that "[n]othing in military jurisprudence
precludes a military judge from making remarks related to
sentencing." 188 The court reviewed the relevant and properly considered
matters for sentencing, including prosecution aggravation evidence;
victim impact evidence; defense extenuation and mitigation evidence;
and "additional matters," including evidence properly introduced during
the merits trial and evidence of any mental health impairment or

187. Id. at 858.
188. Id. The Court also referenced an Army memorandum opinion from nearly thirty years
prior that had found that "[t]he military judge's exposition to provide the accused with an idea of the
foundation of his sentence was not error per se, but is 'a potentially erroneous practice."' Id. (citing
United States v. Gardner, ARMY 8801082, at *2 (A.C.M.R. Nov. 3, 1988) (per curiam)). The error
the Gardner court was referring to was the judge's reliance on matters outside of the record-

specifically, that the judge informed the accused, before announcing the sentence, that he had taken
a drive on post (in Germany) during his deliberations, noticed all of the soldier support resources
available, and decided, contrary to the accused's claim that he had not received the support he
needed, that the accused had squandered his given opportunities. Gardner,ARMY 8801082 at *1-2.
This obvious departure from appropriate sentencing considerations notwithstanding, the Gardner
court nonetheless recognized that "an individual case may necessitate some explanation of the

sentence adjudged." Id. at *2.
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deficiency of the accused. 189 Then, "reviewing the military judge's
comments in the context of the entire record," the court concluded that
"the statements of the military judge indicate he clearly understood and
properly considered" evidence relating to aggravation, extenuation and
mitigation, victim impact, and the accused's mental condition.1 90
Moving on to the specific issue of the judge noting that he was
personally grieved by the impact of the accused's crimes, the court noted
that "consideration of the impact of the offense is an important factor in
the exercise of that discretion," and that "[i]t is not per se impermissible
that a military judge articulate being moved by the impact of the
proceedings on the victims, appellant, and appellant's family. Nor is it
impermissible for a military judge to form a feeling of compassion in a
criminal sentencing context." 191 "[C]ompassion," the court continued,
"has an honored place in justice."'9 2 The judge was clearly moved by the
suffering he observed "during the proceedings."1 93 The judge's balanced
sense of compassion, directed to all parties concerned, "allowed him to
perceive and understand every dimension of the overwhelming effect
and incalculable suffering of the victims, the appellant's family, and
appellant."194 Overall, the military judge's comments "evoked
'established sentencing principles and tied those principles to [the
accused's] actions' and the effect of his actions on his victims, his
family, and the Army."1 95
As to the second specific challenge addressed by the Russell court,
that the judge's mention of a "bitter cup" was an impermissible religious
reference that indicated that the judge included himself as a victim of the
proceeding, the court found this claim without merit.1 96 The court
reaffirmed that a judge may not "interject his or her personal religious
beliefs into the sentencing process," and that courts "cannot sanction
sentencing procedures that create the perception of the bench as a pulpit
from which judges announce their personal sense of religiosity and
simultaneously punish defendants for offending it."197 These are useful
barometers to be sure, but the court found no such lines crossed in the
Russell case. Finally, in a rare bit of guidance on articulating sentences

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Russell, 76 M.J. at 859.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 859-60.
Id. at 860.
Id. (quoting United States v. Green, 64 M.J. 289, 295 (C.A.A.F. 2007)).
Id.
Id.
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generally, the court quoted from the memorandum opinion of its
predecessor court nearly twenty years prior: "We encourage the military
judge in such cases to restrict his comments to addressing the need
demonstrated, and not expound his personal opinions. Explanatory
comments must not become an obloquy, impeach the findings or
98
sentence, or make reference to matters outside the record."1
One reasonable takeaway from Russell is that comments should be
limited to what is necessary and supported by evidence in the record.
But as federal and military examples illustrate, what is "necessary" or
permissible is a matter of discretion that may include articulating the
bases for a sentence for the benefit of both observers and appellate
review, as well as, potentially, the salutary benefits of addressing the
accused directly. As for the fact that even the judge's extensive,
personally-felt comments in Russell were found to be without error, this
case leaves no doubt that sentencing judges have considerable discretion
in their comments.
Rounding out the Army Court of Criminal Appeals' approach to
sentence comments, the court recently upheld a sentence due in part to
the judge's explanation, right after announcing the sentence, that
confinement records that had been improperly admitted during the
sentencing phase of trial "had no impact on the court's deliberation on a
sentence." 99 The appellate court cited approvingly to the CAAF's
endorsement of a military judge's statement on the record that he did not
200
Even if the result
give any weight to improperly considered evidence.
due to the
disclaimer,
judge's
the
would have been the same without
20
on
articulating
"low materiality" of the admitted evidence, ' the judge's
20 2
the record certainly aided the decision.
Other military service appellate courts have had a few noteworthy
opinions that address comments on a sentence. In United States v.

198. Id. at 861 (citing United States v. Gardner, ARMY 8801082, at *2 (A.C.M.R. Nov. 3,
1988) (per curiam)).
199. United States v. Ramos-Cruz, ARMY 20150292, 2020 WL 973392, at *5 (A. Ct. Crim.
App. Feb. 27, 2020). The Government had offered the confinement records into evidence as proof
of the accused's behavior while confined. Id. at *2. Based on problematic authentication and other
evidentiary issues related to the records, the appellate court, for purposes of appellate review,
assumed, without deciding, that the judge had erred in admitting the documents. Id. at *5.
200. Id. ("In Barker, [the CAAF] noted the significance of the military judge 'specifically
stat[ing] on the record' that he did not give any weight to evidence that did not directly relate to or
arise from appellant's crimes contained in victim impact statements which were later deemed
erroneously admitted.") (citing United States v. Barker, 77 M.J. 377, 384 n.l 1 (C.A.A.F. 2018)).
201. Id.
202. As the court noted, "We question if any clearer indicia that appellant's sentence was not
substantially influenced could exist beyond the sentencing authority affirmatively stating the exhibit
'had no impact."' Id.
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Evans,203 the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Appeals took issue with, but
found no prejudicial error, when a military judge summarily explained
that he adjudged a punitive discharge as part of the accused's sentence
simply because "you requested it, I granted it." 204 The issue was not that
the judge commented, but that his comment suggested that the reason he
granted a punitive discharge was exclusively tied to the accused's
request. The court found that the "request for a punitive discharge is
only a factor to be considered, albeit generally a significant one, along
with all other appropriate facts and circumstances before the sentencing
authority." 205 Notably, the court had no comment as to the remainder of
the judge's short explanation, which centered on the accused's age,
"home situation," and the circumstances of his absence. 2 06
In a judge-alone murder case involving a young infant, the Air
Force Court of Criminal Appeals found no error when the trial judge,
prior to announcing the sentence, stated in part that "[i]t's the Court's
opinion that leniency is not the responsibility of the Court," but rather
that it was the court's responsibility to adjudge a "fair and just sentence,
taking into account the needs of good order and discipline in the
military, the needs of [the accused] and also the welfare of society." 2 07
The judge's announced sentence was twice what the accused had agreed
to with the convening authority and was subsequently adjusted
downward by the convening authority based on the accused's pre-trial
agreement. 2 0 The appellate court ultimately found no issue with the trial

203. United States v. Evans, 35 M.J. 754 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1992).
204. Id. at 761.
205. Id.
206. Id. The military judge's sentence explanation in whole was the following:
I take note that I considered your request for a BCD [bad conduct discharge] and
because you requested it, I granted it. I also considered the reasons you proffered as to

why you went UA [unauthorized absence] and your home situation and I considered
your age in awarding a sentence. You should know that, but for those reasons, the
amount of time that you were absent from the military service and the fact that all three

of your absences was [sic] terminated by apprehension would have ordinarily earned you
a far longer, lengthier sentence to confinement. That's all I have to say.

Id.
207. United States v. Valois, No. ACM 36841, 2009 WL 1507981, at *6-7 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App. Mar. 31, 2009).
208.

Id. at *1. Prior to amendments that took effect in 2019, when the accused was found guilty

pursuant to a pretrial agreement, the military judge announced a sentence based on the judge's
independent discretion before becoming aware of any sentence limitations that the accused agreed

to with the convening authority. See 2016 MCM, supra note 104, R.C.M. 910(f)(3). While the
sentence announced by the court could not exceed that to which the accused agreed with the

convening authority, after the sentence was announced, it would be adjusted downward by the
convening authority consistent with the agreement. See id. R.C.M. 1107(d)(1)(C)(ii). These pretrial
agreement provisions for determining a sentence blind to the underlying agreement now generally
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judge's comments and held that the judge did not abuse his discretion in
determining an appropriate sentence because the judge's comments
made clear that he had properly considered the accused's character
statements and that he had considered proper matters overall in arriving
209
The judge's
at what he believed to be a fair and just sentence.
2 10
comments did not reveal an "inflexible attitude towards sentencing."
In this case, where the accused's attack against the judge for not
considering "leniency" was really an attack on the length of the sentence
itself (which ended up being adjusted to meet the range that he had
agreed to with the convening authority), the judge's comments actually
helped make the final result more certain by demonstrating that he had
211
applied proper reasoning to reach it.
In another reminder of the importance of disclaiming impermissible
sentencing factors, the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, in a 2019
unpublished opinion, 1 2 found the sentencing judge's comments
appropriate when the judge stated he would not consider the collateral
of the accused's plea to larceny of housing
consequences
allowances-specifically, that the accused was subject to recoupment of
over $200,000 of the amount, a fact that was commented on by the
prosecution.213 This administrative recoupment was irrelevant to the
judge's sentencing 214determination, and his comments confirmed that he
did not consider it.
G. A Summary of Military Appellate Court Guidance
When it comes to summarizing the takeaways from military
appellate opinions on the reasons for a sentence, the highest military
appellate court offers a helpful starting proposition: "Sentences in
criminal cases should reveal with fair certainty the intent of the court and
exclude any serious misapprehensions by those who must execute

only apply to offenses committed prior to January 1, 2019. See generally 2019 MCM, supra note
57, R.C.M. 902A ("Application of sentencing rules").
209. Valois, 2009 WL 1507981 at *7.
210. Id.
211.

Id. at *6-7.

212.

Opinions are published, generally, when the issues addressed "make a significant

contribution to military justice jurisprudence," or call needed attention to an area of the law. U.S.

A.F. CT. CRim. APP. R. 30.4(a), https://afcca.law.af.mil/resources_1_4.html. Unpublished opinions
are useful for reference but have no precedential value.
213. United States v. Yebba, No. ACM S32519, 2019 WL 4011863, at *3, *5 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App. Aug. 23, 2019).
214. The judge specifically stated, before announcing the sentence, "It's always tempting to
comment on kind of your thought process, which I can't do, I just always remind myself collateral
matters are just that . . . [t]hey're not for me to consider." Id. at *3.
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them." 215 While the CAAF's remarks, in this case, had to do with when a
term of the announced sentence is itself ambiguous, it is a logical
follow-on that the reasons supporting a sentence, properly stated, can
also help avoid misunderstandings about the intent of the court.
The following list, taken only from military appellate law, is not
meant to be a complete or exclusive summary of what a military judge
may or may not refer to when commenting on a sentence. Rather, it
illustrates that military courts have issued far more guidance on
commenting on a sentence than may be first apparent-guidance that is
entirely consistent with the stated sentencing principles in Article 56 of
the UCMJ.
To summarize military case law, when explaining a sentence, a
military judge's comments must:
(1) Reflect individualized consideration

matters;

216

of all relevant sentencing

21 7

(2) Be appropriate to the offense 2 18 and any aggravating, extenuating,
and mitigating circumstances;
(3) Be "responsive to the character, the background, and potential for
2 19
rehabilitation of the particular accused;"
(4) Be supported by evidence in the trial record, 220 including evidence
introduced on the merits; 22 1 and
(5) Reflect any mandatory sentencing considerations (e.g., nonjudicial
222
punishment/credit).
In making these comments, a military judge may:
223
(1) Refer to basic sentencing principles.
(2) Refer to the impact of the accused's offenses on the victim(s), the
224
accused's family, and the Army.
225
(3) Refer to evidence as to the accused's mental condition.

215. United States v. Stewart, 62 M.J. 291, 294 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (citing United States v.
Daugherty, 269 U.S. 360, 363 (1926)).
216. United States v. Mamaluy, 27 C.M.R. 176, 180 (C.M.A. 1959).
217. United States v. Evans, 35 M.J. 754, 761 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1992).
218. United States v. Hill, 44 C.M.R. 257, 261 (C.M.A. 1972).
219. Id.
220.

See id. at 261-62 ("As we read the record, the judge set out his reasons for imposing the

sentence he did.... Admissible evidence amply supports each of the reasons listed by the
judge.. . .The decision of the United States Navy court of Military Review is affirmed.")
221. United States v. Russell, 76 M.J. 855, 859 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2017).
222. United States v. Oliver, 44 C.M.R. 384, 386 (A.C.M.R. 1971).
223. United States v. Green, 64 M.J. 289, 292 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
224. Id.
225. Russell, 76 M.J. at 859.
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(4) Address matters raised directly by the accused or defense. 226
(5) Refer to the accused's request for a particular sentence, though not
as the sole basis for the sentence adjudged. 227
(6) Express compassion for all parties involved.228
229
(7) Make reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial.
A military judge must not:
(1) Rely on general deterrence or generalized sentencing factors at the
expense of adjudging a sentence that is individually tailored to the
circumstances of the case and the accused. 230
(2) Comment on impermissible sentencing matters such as collateral
effects or consequences, 231 or improperly admitted or inadmissible
evidence. 232
(3) Base a sentence on the accused's, or anyone else's, race, religion,
or gender. 233
(4) Interject personal opinions and beliefs, religious or otherwise. 234

(5) Impeach the findings.2 35
(6) Base the adjudged sentence solely on the request or advocacy of
either party. 236
(7) Articulate speculative bases for the sentence not supported by the
trial record.237
(8) Make reference to matters outside the record. 238

The conceptual overlap and consistency with the mandatory
sentencing considerations in Article 56 of the UCMJ is obvious. If a
judge's sentencing comments are constrained to the sentencing

226. Green, 64 M.J. at 293.
227. United States v. Evans, 35 M.J. 754, 761 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1992).
228. Russell, 76 M.J. at 859.
229. United States v. Stevens, 21 M.J. 649, 652 (A.C.M.R. 1985).
230. United States v. Mamaluy, 27 C.M.R. 176, 180-81 (C.M.A. 1959).
231. United States v. McNutt, 62 M.J. 16, 19-20 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (holding that the military
judge erred in considering an administrative good time credit policy when sentencing); United
States v. Yebba, No. ACM S32519, 2019 WL 4011863, at *4 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 23, 2019)
(stating that administrative recoupment is a collateral consequence that cannot be considered for an
appropriate sentence).
232. United States v. Ramos-Cruz, ARMY 20150292, 2020 WL 973392, at *5 (A. Ct. Crim.
App. Feb. 27, 2020).
233. Russell, 76 M.J. at 859-60 (citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977)). Hate
crimes where the victim's status is an aggravating factor might be an exception but are rare in
military jurisprudence.
234. United States v. Green, 64 M.J. 289, 293 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
235. Russell, 76 M.J. at 861.
236. United States v. Evans, 35 M.J. 754, 761 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1992); United States v.
Wheeler, 38 C.M.R. 72, 74-75 (C.M.A. 1967).
237. See United States v. Stevens, 21 M.J. 649, 652 (A.C.M.R. 1985).
238. Russell, 76 M.J. at 861.
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considerations outlined by Article 56 and framed within the clear "dos"
and "don'ts" addressed in military case law, there is little risk that the
comments will be found to be in error.
H. Explaining a Sentence Fulfills Existing Case Law Principles
Given the evolving military sentencing scenario, it is no longer as
simple as concluding that saying nothing about a sentence equals no
error. Military judges can and should do more to make records clear for
appellate review and for interested parties. The seminal military case
that established why military judges must appropriately highlight for
members the particular law and evidence at issue in a sentencing case is
now, over fifty years later, a good pathway to explaining why the
sentencing outcome should also be explained. In the Vietnam-era case of
United States v. Wheeler,239 the CMA found reversible error when the
presiding law officer (the precursor to military judges) failed to tailor his
sentencing instructions to the court members based on the particular law
and evidence in that case. 240 By merely reiterating the maximum
punishment for absence without leave, without a word about the
significant evidence in aggravation and especially in mitigation, the law
officer failed "to inform the court members fully as to their
responsibilities," to enable them to properly exercise their sentencing
discretion, "particularly ... in light of the range of punishments to which
a military accused may be subjected under the Code." 241 This standard
was not met by "a mere rote instruction on the maximum imposable
sentence." 242
As first set out in Wheeler, the requirement for military judges to
explain to court members the implications of various possible sentences
is now literally scripted in the Military Judges' Benchbook.243 Judges
also have the option to list case-specific "Wheeler factors" for the
members, in order to highlight particular evidence in extenuation and/or
mitigation that they should consider. 2" Court members are now
instructed extensively on the permissible range and implications of
particular punishments, tailored to the evidence in the case. In

35 M.J. 754 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1992).
Wheeler, 38 C.M.R. at 76.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 75.
DA PAM. 27-9, supra note 9, para. 2-6-10.
See, e.g., United States v. Hopkins, 56 MJ. 393, 394-95 (C.A.A.F. 2002); see also DA
PAM. 27-9, supra note 9, para. 2-6-11.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
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judge-alone cases, military judges are presumed to know and follow
these same guidelines.
The basic UCMJ sentencing regime has changed little since
Wheeler:
With the exception of specified instances of mandatory
punishments ... almost every offense under the Code is left to be
punished "as a court-martial may direct." The only restrictions to be
found on that power are in the codal prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment and in the authority granted [to] the President to
prescribe maximum limitations on the discretion thus conferred upon
245
the court-martial.

Given the broad sentencing discretion in courts-martial, Wheeler made
clear that the sentencing authority must abide by appropriate guidance
going into a sentencing decision to ensure that it is an informed decision.
It is not such a great leap, over fifty years later, to conclude that it is now
appropriate to inform others, beyond just a bare pronouncement, of the
case-based reasons for the sentence that is announced.
Stating the reasons for a sentence could only help increase
understanding, and potentially acceptance of, the decision by interested
parties. Wheeler emphasized the "duty of the law officer to advise the
court-martial of the nature of its sole responsibility for the sentence; the
exercise of its duty; and what it was entitled to consider." 2 46 It is entirely
consistent with this duty for a military judge, after arriving at a sentence,
to explain what she did consider, especially when competing sentence
evidence was presented in an adversarial setting. As the Wheeler court
noted, trial and defense counsel are acting as advocates in their
respective sentencing arguments, and in terms of the appropriate
outcome "[they] take no sides on the issue."247 Nor does a sentencing
judge necessarily "take a side" with either party as to sentencing; rather,
she weighs relevant considerations to arrive at a just and appropriate
sentence based on the individual circumstances of the case. 248 Interested
parties are likely to already have preconceptions about the "just"
outcome in a case. Both ethically and as a matter of principle, judges

245. Wheeler, 38 C.M.R at 74. Notably, this is similar to the broad sentencing regime in
federal courts prior to the creation of the Guidelines and sentencing reform.
246. Id. at 76.
247. Id.
248. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 52-53 (2007) ("It has been uniform and
constant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider every convicted person
as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate,
sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue.") (quoting Koon v. United States, 518
U.S. 81, 113 (1996)).
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should do everything in their power to ensure that a sentence is not only
fair but fairly perceived. 249
Arriving at a sentence is not a guessing game, nor should
participants have to guess at how that sentence was achieved. During
trial on the merits, military judges habitually instruct panel members that
intent may be inferred based on the circumstances because direct
evidence of intent is often unavailable.25 0 However, direct evidence is
nearly always preferable for its reliability. Someone seeing it rain is
more reliable evidence that it rained than if the same person testified that
the street was wet in the morning, inferring that it had rained during the
night. Given that sentence appropriateness is one of the review powers
of military appellate courts, 25 an articulation of the rationale for a
specific sentence would be direct evidence of the application of the
appropriate sentencing considerations and would aid the appellate court
in its review. A judge can also allay suspicions of bias and take some of
the mystery out of the bare pronouncement of a numerical term of
confinement or some other sentence by clearly articulating the
evidence-based reasons for a particular sentence. Such an explanation
can help demonstrate that the process, regardless of individual
differences about the result, was fairly and appropriately applied.
In terms of creating error by commenting on a sentence, a judge
should not be concerned about going too far if he abides by Article 56
and supporting appellate case law. Not a single appellate case that
directly addressed a judge's sentencing comments on the record has
revealed a concern about the deliberative process or disputed the ability
of a judge to make comments. Nor should fear of reversal for relying on
inappropriate considerations be a basis to remain silent; if a judge
arrived at a sentence inappropriately, is not the justice process better
served if that error is made known? Closely abiding by Article 56 and
related case law will, however, minimize the risk of error.

249. The Preamble to the Code of Judicial Conduct for Army Trial and Appellate Judges, for
example, notes that "Army judges, individually and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial
office as a public trust and strive to maintain and enhance confidence in the military legal system."
U.S. ARMY JUDICIARY, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR ARMY TRIAL AND APPELLATE JUDGES,

pmbl., at 1 (2008).
250.

See, e.g., DA PAM. 27-9, supra note 9, para. 7-3 ("Direct evidence of intent is often

unavailable. The accused's intent, however, may be proved by circumstantial evidence.").
251. See UCMJ art. 66, 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)-(e).
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Other Sentencing Guidance to Military Judges

While relevant statutes and case law allow but do not require
transparency in explaining a court-martial sentence, regulatory and
policy guidance is also thin. 2 2 In the Army, 25 3 there is no direct
regulatory guidance in this area.2 54 The Army Trial Judiciary's Standard
Operating Procedure offers no guidance as to announcing a sentence. 25
The Military Judges' Benchbook, or Trial Guide,25` recognizes that
among other general obligations, a military judge "should analyze
problems arising in court and, if appropriate, should recommend
legislative and other changes that will improve the administration and
cause of justice," 2 1 a description that arguably applies to the very
purpose of this Article. Yet the script in the Trial Guide for announcing a
sentence merely leaves an unelaborated blank to fill in the adjudged
sentence.2 ss
For professional responsibility guidance, military judges look to
their respective Judicial Codes of Conduct25 9 and professional
responsibility regulations. 260 In the Army, there is no direct guidance in
either publication as to whether it is appropriate to comment on a

252. when prescribed by the President, the Service Secretaries are authorized to implement
provisions in the MCM by regulation. See, e.g., UCMJ art. 58, 10 U.S.C. § 858(a) ("Under such
instructions as the Secretary concerned may prescribe .... ").
253. As Army judge advocates, the authors are most familiar with the experience of the Army
Judge Advocate General's Corps which, having been founded by General George Washington on
July 29th, 1775, bills itself as the Nation's "oldest and largest law firm." See Army Jag Corps:
History, U.S. ARMY, https://www.goarmy.com/jag/about/history.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2020).
254. The Army's implementing regulation is Army Regulation (AR) 27-10. The only reference
to sentencing procedures is a list of potential personnel records that may be offered in sentencing.
See U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, INTERIM ARMY REGUL. 27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE, para. 5-36 (Jan. 1,
2019).
255.

See U.S. ARMY TRIAL

JUDICIARY,

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES (2018). The only

guidance even remotely related to this is where the Standing Operating Procedures advises trial
judges not to discuss their deliberative process when conducting post-trial conferences or annual
training sessions with counsel. See id., ch. 11, para. 4(c)(7) (citing United States v. Matthews, 68
M.J. 29 (C.A.A.F. 2009)); see also id., ch. 11, para. 5(b) (cautioning that "[j]udges must remain
vigilant and avoid disclosing matters protected by the deliberative process privilege" during training
sessions with counsel). But as the discussion in this Article makes clear, protecting deliberative
process and articulating evidence-based reasons for a sentence on the record are mutually
compatible interests.
256. DA PAM. 27-9, supra note 9. The Benchbook is a United States Army Trial Judiciary
publication that is used by trial judges in all services and is referred to by some services as the Trial
Guide.
257. Id. para. 1-1.a(1).
258. Id. para. 2-4-2.
259. See, e.g., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR ARMY TRIAL AND APPELLATE JUDGES (U.S.
ARMY TRIAL JUDICIARY 2008) (operating as the code of conduct for Army Judges) [hereinafter
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT].
260. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, ARMY REGUL. 27-26, RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT FOR

LAWYERS (May 1, 1992) (operating as the Army's professional responsibility regulation).
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court-martial sentence, let alone how to do so. Yet again, general
guidance as to a judge's responsibilities is compatible with the idea of
developing a practice and procedures to explain a sentence. 261
J.

Military Culture Overstates the Concerns with Explaining a
Sentence

In order to determine the full extent of the undeniably pervasive
taboo against sentence transparency in the military, one need look no
further than the culture that perpetuates it. A rite of passage for military
judges is attendance and graduation from the Military Judges' Course at
the United States Army Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and
School in Charlottesville, Virginia. There, perhaps for the first time,
military judge candidates hear from grizzled, veteran judges that when
announcing a sentence, commentary is strongly discouraged. There is
clearly a disconnect between this broadly held conventional wisdom and
the recognition of many current military judges that commenting on a
sentence may be appropriate and even desirable. A recent survey of
twenty-five Army judges indicated that eighty-eight percent of
responding judges had never commented on the record about their
announced sentence.2 62 Eighty-three percent of the judges who had never
commented gave as their rationale that they were discouraged from
doing so by other members of the trial judiciary.2 63 Yet only twenty
percent personally felt that it was inappropriate to comment on the
sentence. 2" When asked if they would explain their sentence if
encouraged to do so and if provided with guidelines, eighty-eight
percent said they would.2 6s
While experienced judges are sometimes quick to point out
egregious examples of judges that commented inappropriately on the
findings or sentence, a careful review of appellate case law, as discussed
above, shows that the existing cautionary tales are not as discouraging as
they may first seem.2 66 A review of these examples suggests that a trial

261. The Preamble to the Code of Judicial Conduct for Army Trial and Appellate Judges, for
example, notes that "Army judges, individually and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial
office as a public trust and strive to maintain and enhance confidence in the military legal system."
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 259, at 1.

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
States v.

Transparency in Sentencing Survey (Oct. 30, 2019) (on file with author).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 76 M.J. 855, 858-60 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2017); United
Hill, 44 C.M.R. 257, 260 (C.M.A. 1972). Both of the cases, discussed above, are common

examples.
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judge is most likely to make injudicious comments when attempting to
lecture the accused based on emotion or personal opinion. While a judge
may address the accused directly, doing so for the purpose of
administering a lecture or reprimand should give one significant pause.
Given that a reprimand is an authorized punishment that, when
26 7
adjudged, is imposed by the convening authority, and not the judge, it
would be inappropriate to additionally reprimand the accused on the
record.
While a bare announcement of a sentence can sometimes avoid
errors (or, conversely, make it more difficult to discern whether a
sentence was properly determined), a tremendous opportunity is lost by
such a conservative approach. Concluding that a judge should not
articulate the reasons for his sentence for fear of reversal is not too far
removed from suggesting, in vain of course, that a judge should not
articulate the basis for a legal ruling because it may reveal errors in his
reasoning. Just like the lack of a clearly articulated legal ruling can
create its own risk of reversal, the presence of a properly articulated
sentence can help protect the integrity of the result and aid the
understanding of the parties involved. When properly articulated, a trial
judge's sentence explanation will provide additional information to the
appellate court to use in determining the appropriateness of the sentence.
Occasionally, an appellate court will reassess a sentence after concluding
it was inappropriately severe. 268 An explanation on the record for the
adjudged sentence may demonstrate persuasively that the sentence
should be affirmed. At the very least, an explanation of the permissible
considerations that weighed heavily in favor of a specific sentence
provides a rationale to the appellate court to aid in determining sentence
appropriateness.

267. 2019 MCM, supra note 57, R.C.M. 1003(b)(1).
268. See, e.g., U.S. v. Reyna-Rivera, ARMY 20140527, 2015 WL 3991143, at *3-4 (A. Ct.
Crim. App. June 30, 2015) (finding an adjudged dismissal and fifteen months' confinement for
assault consummated by a battery and violations of a lawful general regulation "inappropriately
severe" in light of the maximum possible sentence, the appellant's service record, the impact on the
alleged victim from the offenses, the impact of the sentence on the appellant's family, and other

matters); United States v. Tucker, No. 9900935, 2002 WL 5675, at *2-3 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Dec.
7, 2001) (finding a sentence for various offenses relating to the explosive C-4 to be inappropriately
severe in its own right and as compared to the sentences of other participants' cases that were
"closely related" to the accused's offenses). But see United States v. Durant III, 55 M.J. 258, 261

(C.A.A.F. 2001) ("Just as 'disparity in sentencing among codefendants is not, by itself, a sufficient
ground for attacking an otherwise proper sentence under the [federal sentencing] guidelines,' the

military system must be prepared to accept some disparity in the sentencing of codefendants,
provided each military accused is sentenced as an individual." (quoting United States v. Hoy, 932
F.2d 1343, 1345 (9th Cir. 1991))).
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More compellingly, an explanation of the sentence has the potential
to be of immense value and benefit to the accused, the victim, and the
military unit. For the accused and his or her family and friends, an
explanation that heroism in combat or the traumatic effects of combat
was a significant factor when adjudging a sentence that does not include
a punitive discharge assures those individuals that the military judge has
given appropriate consideration to the accused's history and
characteristics since it is required under Article 56.269 In fact, if
expressed artfully, the judge's words may inspire the accused to take
advantage of the second chance being presented, in a forum and moment
in time he is not likely to soon forget. For a victim, to hear that a
significant term of confinement was imposed in part for the protection of
society and for the impact of the offense on the victim reminds the
victim that she has been heard and may bring her one step closer toward
being able to move on.2 70 Members of the unit, present in the gallery or
informed of the sentence later, may be reassured or deterred to note that
significant weight was given to the effect of drug distribution in the
barracks on good order and discipline in the unit. 27 1
The following case is typical of what could arise in a court-martial
anywhere in the United States or even overseas: a twenty-year-old
private, new to the military and away from her family for the first time,
overindulges in alcohol during a holiday celebration with other soldier
friends before attempting to drive back to her on-post barracks.
Tragically, due to the private's own intoxication and bad weather, the
private hits and seriously injures a civilian utility worker trying to fix a
downed power line just outside the post. The worker recovers but is
expected to have lifelong facial scars. The victim's family and the
accused private's family, neither of whom have ever set foot on a
military post prior to trial, both attend the ensuing court-martial. In an
emotional trial and sentencing proceeding, the accused expresses

269.
270.

See 10 U.S.C. § 856(c)(1)(A).
Article 56 of the UCMJ requires that a court-martial, when sentencing, must take into

consideration the impact of the offense on "the financial, social, psychological,

well-being of any victim of the offense," id.

§ 856(c)(1)(B)(i),

protect others from further crimes by the accused." Id.

271.

or medical

and the need for the sentence "to

§ 856(c)(l)(C)(v).

Article 56 of the UCMJ also states that in sentencing the accused, the court-martial "shall

impose a punishment that is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to promote justice and to

maintain good order and discipline in the armed forces." Id. § 856(c)(1). Further, Article 56 requires
that the impact of the offense on "the mission, discipline, or efficiency on the command of the
accused and any victim of the offense," be taken into consideration when sentencing.

Id.

§ 856(c)(1xB)(ii).
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genuine remorse; the victim, in a moment of grace, says he harbors no
ill-will but only desires a just outcome.
In a case like this, there can be no doubt that all eyes are watching
the ultimate result and how it is achieved. A victim with no military
affiliation no doubt has some impression of military "justice" going into
the process and wonders whether the military justice system truly metes
out justice or just takes care of its own. Likewise, the accused's family,
with no military background or perspective, may wonder whether their
baby daughter will just be overwhelmed by the system or made an
example of. The accused, for her part, may feel overwhelmed,
intimidated, or simply confused about the legal process that she is
enduring. A situation like this is ripe for aiding public trust and
understanding of the court-martial process, in part by explaining the
reasons for the sentence. The goal is not to satisfy any side, lecture any
side, or send a message. Justice must be served, and that justice may
rightfully be merciful or harsh depending on the circumstances. The goal
of explaining the sentence is to aid understanding, a goal explicitly
endorsed by the Supreme Court in Rita and an opportunity that is lost if
a judge remains silent.2 72
III.

CONCLUSION

While federal sentencing is hardly a model of simplicity, the
process does aim for an appropriate level of consistency and
transparency. The statement of reasons, in whatever form it takes in any
particular federal district court, provides a level of understanding to the
parties and public that is not currently available in court-martial practice.
As one circuit court described 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c):
In thus "enabl[ing] the public to learn why [the] defendant received a
particular sentence," section 3553(c) has implications beyond the
immediate rights of criminal defendants or the government, or the
effective conduct of particular criminal proceedings. It tends to instill
understanding of, trust in, and respect for the court and its proceedings
on the part both of those who are themselves parties to the proceeding
and those who are not... . [P]eople in an open society do not demand
infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept
what they have insufficient information to understand. When a
statement of reasons is given, there is at least an opportunity for

272. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357 (2007).
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understanding both the system in general and its workings in the
particular case. 273

Without importing the federal system's formulaic approach, the
military can adopt the federal practice of explaining the sentence to the
accused and all who would hear or act on the sentence. The first part of
the Appendix is an example of a worksheet used by a military judge to
announce a sentence in current court-martial practice.2 74 The latter part
of the Appendix suggests a template for explaining a sentence that is
wholly consistent with prevailing case law, Article 56 of the UCMJ, and
the trend toward more open sentencing. 275 As established, there is no
statutory or common law prohibition against explaining a sentence, and
empirical research and the trend in military justice reform indicates that
the time is right. Pronouncing a sentence is a life-altering event. Tying
the sentencing process to the sentence adjudged, in a measured and
temperate explanation, is not only lawful but also worthwhile,
appropriate, and overdue.

273. United States v. Lewis, 424 F.3d 239, 247 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted).
274. See infra app.
275. See infra app.
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APPENDIX
1. Sentence Announcement Worksheet - Military Judge Use Only
Note: Strike out inapplicableportions, and announce only the
underlinedportions that remain

LEVEL OF COURT: (SPGM JA) (BGD) (GCM)
Private Susan S. Smith, this court-martial sentences you:

[]

To nopnsmn

[]

To be reriaded

[X] To be reduced to the grade of E-1

[3To forfeit 1dollar pay per-month for

months]

[ail pa and allowances]

[] To

be rstued fo

p or (aavs)
In nertr +an labo witou .,*nnmentF
[X]

+I

-(days)

(imnhs) to the liit of

__

d

~es no confinement]:

To be confined as follows

For The Specification of
Charge I

To be confined for 6 months

For The Specification of

To be confined for 1 month

Charge II

All sentences to confinement will be served concurrently
sye
(eeseutive

fX} The Court adjudges no fines [To be

fined
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rge from the servie

Please be seated.
Note: If explaining the sentence, proceed to Part2, Statement of
Reasons

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2020

45

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 4

108

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:63

2. Statement of Reasons - Military Judge Use Only
General Guidance
When applicable and appropriate (e.g., you have departed substantially
from the counsels' recommended sentence), consider the following
guidelines when providing explanatory remarks for your sentence.
Your explanation MUST NOT contain any of the following:
1. Reprimand
2. Lecture
3. Comments on facts not in evidence
4. Comments on collateral consequences
5. Comments on the strength of the case on the merits
6. Comments on prosecutorial discretion
7. Personal feelings or bias
Your explanation SHOULD:

-

-

1. Be tailored to the sentencing considerations in Article 56, UCMJ and
RCM 1002(f), i.e., the minimum sufficient punishment necessary to
promote justice and to maintain good order and discipline, taking into
consideration
(a) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the accused;
(b) the impact of the offense on
(i) the financial, social, psychological, or medical wellbeing of any victim of the offense; and
(ii) the mission, discipline, or efficiency of the
command of the accused and any victim of the offense;
(c) the need for the sentence
(i) to reflect the seriousness of the offense;
(ii) to promote respect for the law;
(iii) to provide just punishment for the offense;
(iv) to promote adequate deterrence of misconduct;
(v) to protect others from further crimes by the accused;
(vi) to rehabilitate the accused;
(vii) to provide, in appropriate cases, the opportunity for
retraining and return to duty to meet the needs of the
service; and
(d) the available sentences.
2. Reflect individualized consideration of all relevant sentencing
matters, including matters in aggravation, extenuation, and mitigation.
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3. Be directed to the widest audience, and if necessary, tailored to the
accused or victim based on evidence in the record.
4. Be constrained to evidence in the record, or reasonable inferences
arising therefrom.
5. Address any mandatory sentencing considerations (e.g., confinement
credit, Article 15 credit, or reasons for a recommendation to suspend a
sentence IAW R.C.M. 1109(f)).
Statement of Reasons - Sample Script
Note: Adapt this script as necessary to explain the sentence in a
particularcase, immediately before or immediately after announcingthe
sentence.

In deciding the sentence, this Court applied Article 56(c), UCMJ, which
requires the court-martial to take into account the sentencing
considerations listed in that statute to impose punishment that is
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to promote justice and to
maintain good order and discipline in the armed forces.
The Court took into consideration all relevant matters in (aggravation)
(extenuation) (and) (mitigation) raised by the evidence, including
(evidence introduced on the merits) (and) (evidence introduced for
sentencing) (and) (the unsworn statement(s) by the (victim) (and)
(accused) (list other relevant considerations). This includes but is not
limited to [tailor to the facts of the case]:
1. (the relatively severe, yet one-time nature, of the
offense);
2. (the emotional and physical injury to the victim,
including permanent facial scarring);
3. (the short but stellar service record of the accused, as
demonstrated by chain-of-command testimony)
4. (the fact that the accused pled guilty and expressed
remorse); and
5. (the lack of evidence of any impact on the mission,
discipline, or efficiency of the command of the accused
or the victim).
I also considered all available sentences, and the need for this sentence
[tailor to the facts of the case]:
1. to reflect the seriousness of the crime;
2. to promote respect for the law;
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3. to provide just punishment for the offense;
4. to promote adequate deterrence of misconduct;
4. to protect others from crimes by the accused;
5. to rehabilitate the accused; (and)
6. (to provide the accused the opportunity for retraining
and return to duty to meet the needs of the service.)
Note: If addressingthe accused directly, limit comments to those
supported by evidence in the record, and that are necessary to
advance the sentencingpurposes discussed above.
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